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Ömer Faruk Koru
A DISSERTATION
in
Economics
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania
in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
2021

Supervisor of Dissertation

Co-Supervisor of Dissertation

Dirk Krueger

Harold L. Cole

Walter H. and Leonore C. Annenberg

James Joo-Jin Kim Professor of

Professor in the Social Sciences and

Economics

Professor of Economics

Graduate Group Chairperson
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON AUTOMATION, INEQUALITY, AND MACROECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE
Ömer Faruk Koru
Dirk Krueger
Harold Cole

In the first chapter, I provide a theory that links automation to the top income
inequality. I construct a model in which managing labor is harder than managing
capital. Hence, an improvement in automation enables entrepreneurs to scale up
their production. This leads highly productive entrepreneurs to capture a larger
fraction of the market and hence this increases top income inequality. I show that the
shape parameter of the Pareto distribution that characterizes the right tail of income
distribution is inversely related to the automation parameter. Using cross-industry
and cross-country data, I provide empirical support for the model’s prediction.
In the second chapter, I quantitatively analyze the impact of improvements
in automation technology on top wealth shares. I incorporate the production function that I consider in the first chapter into an Aiyagari model with entrepreneurs
and a financial friction. An improvement in automation technology impacts wealth
concentration through two channels: first, it increases the return to entrepreneurial
skill; second, it increases dispersion to return to capital. I calibrate the model to
the 1968 US economy and increased the automation parameter to the 2016 value.
Comparing the two steady-states, the model generates one-fourth of the observed
increase in wealth share of the top 1% and explains 10% of the observed increase in

v

the top 0.1%. In consumption equivalence terms, workers’ welfare increases by 5%,
and entrepreneurs’ welfare increases by 8%.
The third chapter examines the strong positive correlation between job-tojob transition rates and nominal wage growth in the U.S. First, using time series
regressions, structural monetary policy shocks, and survey data on search effort we
provide evidence that inflationary shocks cause higher job-to-job transitions in the
subsequent years. Second, we build a model with aggregate shocks and competitive
on-the-job search in which wages react sluggishly to inflation. Third, we calibrate the
model to the U.S. economy and find that the output response to inflation shock is nonmonotonic. The monetary authority can stimulate productivity with an inflationary
shock through job-to-job transitions.
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CHAPTER 1:
AUTOMATION AND TOP INCOME INEQUALITY
by Ömer Faruk Koru

1.1. Introduction
Income inequality among the top earners, measured as the ratio of the top 0.1%
income share to the top 1% income share, has been increasing in the US for the
last forty years. In other words, the income gap between the super-rich and rich
individuals is increasing. During the same period, there was a significant improvement
in technology, specifically in automation. In this chapter, I provide a theory that links
the automation level to top income inequality.
The left panel of the figure 1.1 plots the relative income share at the top income
distribution. The solid line shows the ratio of the income share of the top 0.01% to
0.1%. The dotted line shows the ratio of the income share of the top 0.1% to 1%.
The dashed line shows the ratio of the income share of the top 1% to top 10%. The
figure shows that top income inequality has been increasing since the 1980s. It is true
whether I define the top income as the top 10%, the top 1%, or the top 0.1%. It can
be seen from the figure that top income inequality has increased by almost half.
It is well-known that the top income distribution of income is well approximated by a Pareto distribution.1 An implication of the Pareto distribution is that
the relative income share is a function of the Pareto parameter. The increase in
top income inequality implies that the Pareto parameter of top income distribution
is decreasing. Our model links the Pareto parameter to automation technology. In
the model, I use a production function similar to Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018b).
1

The CDF of a Pareto distribution with scale parameter c and shape parameter (Pareto parameter) λ is given by F (x) = 1 − (c/x)λ .

1

Figure 1.1: Top Income Inequality and Labor Share
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Note: Left panel: the solid line shows the ratio of income share of top 0.01% to 0.1%. The dotted
line shows the ratio of the income share of the top 0.1% to 1%. The dashed line shows the ratio of
the income share of the top 1% to top 10%. Right panel: The solid line shows the Pareto parameter
implied by the relative income share of top 0.1% to top 1%. The dashed line is the labor share of
income (right axis).
Source: Relative income shares: World Inequality Database; Labor share: Penn World Table 9.1.

This production function implies that the labor share of income is a function of the
automation level, which is also true in our model. In other words, the labor share of
income provides us with a measure of automation in the economy. Therefore, I plot
the labor share and the Pareto parameter on the right panel of figure 1.1. It illustrates that there is a high correlation between automation and top income inequality.
Moreover, I interpret automation in a broad sense. I define automation as labor replacing technology. Our definition includes computers and software (or information
technology (IT) in general) as well as industrial robots. Top income inequality started
to decrease in the 1970s, which is also the dawn of the IT revolution.
There are well-established theories explaining why the right tail of the income
distribution is approximated by a Pareto distribution. I build our theory on the diseconomies of scale argument in Lucas (1978) and Rosen (1981). In these models,
top income inequality depends on the severity of the diseconomies of scale. As the
2

severity of the diseconomies of scale decreases, top skilled entrepreneurs scale up their
production and increase their market share. Hence inequality at the top percentile
rises. However, in these models, the decreasing returns to scale parameter is exogenously given. In this chapter, I endogenize this parameter and show how it changes
with automation.
The idea that technological innovation allows firms to scale up their production
is not new; it goes back to Rosen (1981). However, the main models of technological
progress have no implication for the change in scalability. Technological improvement
is usually modeled as either increase in the productivity of some factor (for example Acemoglu (2002)), change in capital share (for example Acemoglu and Restrepo
(2018b)) or decrease in the price of capital (for example Autor and Dorn (2013)).
None of these affect the decreasing returns to scale of the production function, hence
the change in the Pareto parameter.
In our model, the reason for diseconomies of scale is information friction. In the
model, an entrepreneur does not know whether his employee is working or shirking.
In order to provide his employees with an incentive to exert effort, an entrepreneur
needs to spend additional resources, such as investing in monitoring technology or
paying efficiency wages to workers. If the cost of additional resources is convexly
increasing with the number of workers, then the profit function exhibits decreasing
returns to scale. First, I provide the result for any convex cost function in labor, and
then I show that efficiency wage theory provides a microfoundation for this convex
cost.
I define the level of automation as the share of tasks that can be produced by
capital, as in Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018b). An entrepreneur needs to complete
a set of tasks (such as designing, engineering, accounting, etc.) to produce the final
good. While some of these tasks can be automated (i.e., they can be produced by
3

capital), some of them can only be produced by labor. As automation technology
improves, dependency on labor decreases and convexity of production cost decreases.
Therefore, the scalability problem is associated with the level of automation technology. Our main result links the Pareto parameter of the right tail of the income
distribution to the skill distribution in the population, automation technology, and
the severity of the convexity of the monitoring cost. I show that as automation
technology improves, inequality at the top rises.
To see the mechanism, consider the extreme case: none of the tasks can be
automated. In such a case, the cost of production is the price of labor plus the
monitoring cost, which is convex. Therefore, the top-skilled entrepreneur could only
serve a portion of the market, which enables lower-skilled entrepreneurs to enter
the market. Now, consider the other extreme in which any task can be automated.
In such a case, the only cost of production is the price of capital, which is linear.
Therefore, an entrepreneur has no problem scaling up his output, hence the top
skilled individual captures the entire market. While in the first scenario there is
lower inequality thanks to the existence of other entrepreneurs, in the second scenario
there is perfect inequality since the top talented entrepreneur owns the entire market.
When the economy converges from one extreme to the other, thanks to automation,
the income inequality at the top increases.
I test our main result in the data. One important feature of the task-based
framework is that it endogenizes factor shares of income. Acemoglu and Restrepo
(2018b) and Martinez (2019) show that the labor share of income is a function of automation level. This is also true in our model. However, instead of using automation
as an explanation for the change in labor share, I use labor share of income as a measure of automation. The model predicts that the Pareto parameter is proportional to
the share of non-automated tasks, which is equal to the labor share of income. I test
4

our model’s prediction using two different data. First, I look at the cross-industry
cross-time variation of the labor share and the Pareto parameter in the US. Second, I
look at the cross-country, cross-industry variation in OECD countries. Our regression
results support the model’s prediction.
Our model is static and automation technology is exogenously given. I show
the impact of an exogenous change in automation technology. Although the model is
static, the main result applies to a dynamic model in which the only dynamic choice
is capital accumulation and the entrepreneur’s problem is static since the result does
not depend on the capital stock or prices.
Related Literature: This chapter is related to several strands of literature.
First, I contribute to the literature on the impact of automation on the labor market
outcome (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2020; Autor and Dorn, 2013; Goos, Manning,
and Salomons, 2014; Hémous and Olsen, 2018; Moll, Rachel, and Restrepo, 2019).
This literature mainly focuses on wage inequality between high and low-skill workers.
Martinez (2019) also considers the impact of automation on the span of control,
however, the main focus of that paper is the decrease in labor share. In this chapter,
I look at the inequality among high skilled individuals.
The closest article to the current study is Moll, Rachel, and Restrepo (2019).
They study the impact of automation on income and wealth distribution. In their
model, automation gives rise to higher returns to wealth and hence increases the
incentive to accumulate wealth. Because of the birth and death process, some individuals are lucky to live long enough to accumulate wealth exponentially and end up
in the top percentile of income and wealth distribution. Similar to this chapter, the
thickness of the income distribution is a function of the automation level. Our mechanism is different from this argument. Here, I focus on the increase in entrepreneurial
income which is an important part of the increase in top income inequality (Guvenen
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and Kaplan, 2017; Smith et al., 2019). In our model, automation impacts top income
inequality through the increase in return to entrepreneurial skills. Smith et al. (2019)
show that entrepreneurs are an important fraction of top income earners and their
skill is an integral part of their firm’s performance. In this regard, I believe that the
change in the return to entrepreneurial skills is important to understand the dynamics
of top income inequality.
Second, there is growing literature about the determinants of top income inequality and the change in top income inequality. Gabaix and Landier (2008) and
Tervio (2008) explore the connection between the change in the firm size distribution and an increase in CEO compensation using assignment models. However, the
Pareto parameter in those models is constant, whereas I am interested in the change
in the Pareto parameter. Several other articles study the impact of the decrease in
the top marginal tax rate on the share of top income percentile (Piketty, Saez, and
Stantcheva, 2014; Kim, 2015; Aoki and Nirei, 2017). Aghion et al. (2018) and Jones
and Kim (2018) show that innovation and creative destruction are important factors
for top income inequality. Geerolf (2017) shows that the knowledge-based hierarchies model of Garicano (2000) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) generates
a Pareto tail at the top of income distribution and the Pareto parameter is inversely
related to the number of layers. However, Rajan and Wulf (2006) provide evidence
that the number of layers in corporations in the US is decreasing.
This chapter focuses on the change in the return to entrepreneurial skill as
the main driver of top income inequality. I contribute to the literature on innovation
and top income inequality by providing a mechanism that can explain the increase in
innovation. An alternative interpretation of entrepreneurial skill in our model is the
quality of an idea. I do not consider innovation in our model, though in a richer model
where entrepreneurs exert effort to increase their productivity or the quality of their
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idea, I believe that it can be shown that an increase in the return to entrepreneurial
skill leads to a higher return to innovation, hence more innovation.
The third strand of literature considers the impact of change in factor’s share of
income on inequality. Piketty (2014) argues that capital income is more concentrated
than labor, hence an increase in capital income share leads to higher inequality.
Bengtsson and Waldenström (2018) shows that there is a positive relationship between
capital share in national income and income share of the top 1%. In our model,
the increase in capital income share leads to an increase in top income inequality.
However, the reason for this is not that top income owners are the owners of capital,
but because automation increases the return to entrepreneurial skill. Indeed, since
the 1960s, the share of business income inside the top 0.1% almost doubled (Piketty
and Saez, 2003).
Another related paper, Dogan and Yildirim (2017) study the impact of automation on compensation schemes of workers. In their model, replacing labor with
capital leads to a reduction in peer monitoring, hence firms change the compensation
scheme to incentivize workers to exert effort. In this chapter, I also consider the
monitoring problem of workers. However, our main focus is on top income inequality.
The structure of the chapter is as follows: Section 2 presents the reduced form
model and the main results. Section 3 tests the model prediction. Section 4 provides
a microfoundation for the model in section 2. And section 5 concludes.

1.2. The Model
I consider a static model economy. In order to understand the impact of improvement
in automation technology, I characterize top income distribution and consider the
comparative statistic with respect to the automation level.
There is a unit mass of individuals, each endowed with two types of skill:
labor and entrepreneurial. The labor skill is the same for all individuals, whereas the
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entrepreneurial skill, denoted by z, is distributed with some cumulative distribution
function G with support [zmin , zmax ] ⊂ R+ . There is a fixed amount of capital stock
in the economy, owned by individuals.2
Each individual can either become a worker or an entrepreneur. If an individual becomes a worker, he supplies labor inelastically and earns wage w. If he
becomes an entrepreneur, he rents capital and hires labor in order to produce output
and enjoy a profit, π(z), which is determined in equilibrium. Individuals choose their
occupations to maximize their income.

1.2.1. The Entrepreneur’s Problem
Each entrepreneur has access to production technology. I use a task-based framework
similar to Zeira (1998) and Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018b). To produce a unique
final good, an entrepreneur needs to complete a measure one of the tasks, i ∈ [0, 1].
There is no market for tasks, hence the entrepreneur needs to complete all of the
tasks inside the firm.3
Tasks are complements and they are aggregated into output by a unit elastic
aggregator (i.e., Cobb-Douglas):
Z1
lnY =

lny(i)di,

(1.1)

0

where Y is the total output, and y(i) is the level of task i used in the production.
Given a task i, capital and labor are perfect substitutes. However, there
is a technological constraint on the usage of capital. Some of the tasks are not
technologically automated, meaning that they cannot be produced by capital. There
is an automation technology frontier I such that task i ≤ I can be produced either
2
3

Since the model is static, the distribution of capital is not important.
Assume transportation cost is high enough so that no one wants to trade tasks.
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by capital or by labor, while task i > I can be produced only by labor. Formally, the
production function for task i is:

y(i) =




ki + γi `i

if i ≤ I,



γi `i

if i > I,

(1.2)

where ki and `i denote capital and labor, γi is the productivity of labor in task i. I
assume that γi is increasing in i.4 In other words, i denotes the complexity of the
task, and labor has a comparative advantage relative to capital in high-index tasks.
Since capital and labor are perfect substitutes, only one of them is going to
be used to produce a task. In a sense, automation is labor replacing. Once a task
is automated, capital might replace labor for that task. Because γi is increasing, it
is optimal to automate (i.e. produce by using capital) the low-index tasks first. In
other words, if it is optimal to automate task i, then it is optimal to automate task
j < i. Let I ? ≤ I be the automation decision of the entrepreneur, so that any i < I ?
is automated.5 Then, by combining (1.1) and (1.2), the output is:
ZI ?
lnY =

Z1
lnks ds +

ln (γi `i ) di.

(1.3)

I?

0

Apart from the technological constraint, there is another difference between
labor and capital: the entrepreneur has limited ability to manage the labor. As the
4

For simplicity, I assume that capital has the same productivity for each task, which is normalized
to 1. However, as long as the ratio of labor productivity to capital productivity is increasing the
following analysis holds.
5
I assume that the least productive tasks can be automated. However, Autor and Dorn (2013)
argue that it is the middle-skilled jobs that are more prone to automation. For the more general
cases, suppose M is the set of tasks that can be automated. For the main result of this chapter,
the only important parameter is the measure of tasks that cannot be automated, 1 − |M |. For ease
of interpretation and mathematical computation, I assume the set of automated tasks is connected,
M = [Imin , I). For simplicity, let Imin = 0, since it is always optimal to start automating the least
productive task.
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employment size increases, the entrepreneur losses control over the labor. The usage
of capital does not affect the span of control of the entrepreneur, only the measure
of labor affects it. I represent the loss of control as a cost paid by the entrepreneur.
R1
In order to sustain control, he needs to spend additional resources. Let v( `i di)
I?

denote this cost and assume that it is strictly increasing and convex: v 0 > 0, v 00 > 0.
Moreover, I assume that v(0) = 0 and v 0 (0) = 0. I discuss the interpretation of this
additional cost in the next sub-section.
The entrepreneur’s objective is to maximize profit. He decides which tasks are
to be automated, I ? , how much capital to hire for each automated task, ks for s < I ? ,
and how much labor to hire for tasks that are not automated, `i for i ≥ I ? . Formally,
the entrepreneur’s problem is:


Z1
π(z) =

max

I ? ,{`i }i∈[I ? ,1] ,
{ks }s∈[0,I ? )

zY − w

Z1

`i di − v 
I?

I?



ZI ?

`i di − R

ks ds

(1.4)

0

s.t. 0 ≤ I ? ≤ I,
`i ≥ 0, ks ≥ 0,

and the output is subject to (1.3) where z is an entrepreneurial skill, w is the wage
rate and R is the rental rate of capital.
Our main mechanism works through the convex cost of labor, v. This additional convex cost makes the profit function decreasing returns to scale. Because
the production function, zY , is constant returns to scale and v is convex, zY − v is
decreasing returns to scale. If every task is automated, I ? = 1, then the production
function is constant returns to scale. If there is no automation technology, I ? = 0,
then the model is similar to the span-of-control model of Lucas (1978). Hence, the
level of automation determines the severity of the diseconomies of scale.
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Interpretation of v
The main mechanism of this chapter depends on the convex cost v. Therefore, I
discuss what v represents. The convex cost v represents, in a reduced form, the loss
of control over labor. The idea of v is that labor has an additional cost and this cost
is convexly increasing with employment size. There are several interpretations of this
additional cost of labor.
One interpretation of v is the monitoring cost. Since workers can shirk, the
entrepreneur needs to spend additional resources to prevent workers from shirking
as in the efficiency wage theory (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Calvo, 1985). If the
probability of monitoring is inversely related to the labor force, that leads to a convex
cost of the labor force. Since capital cannot shirk, the size of capital does not affect
the monitoring cost. Therefore v only depends on the labor force.
There are other possible interpretations of v. For example, v can be thought
of as convex hiring and firing cost (Hopenhayn, 1992). Since there is no friction in the
capital market, the cost of capital is just the price. Another interpretation might be
the problem-solving cost of the entrepreneur (Garicano, 2000). If automation means
that the task has a well-defined objective now and capital can solve the problem by
itself, then only labor encounters problems that he cannot solve by himself. He asks
about these problems to the entrepreneur, which costs the entrepreneur time and
effort to solve those problems.
The direct evidence of the convex cost of labor is firm-size-wage-premium.
Large firms pay higher wages than smaller firms, even after controlling for worker
heterogeneity (Oi and Idson, 1999). If the wage rate depends on the employment
size, then firms face a convex cost in labor.
Lemma 1. If wage rate w(L) is strictly increasing in L and positive, then w(L)L is
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strictly convex.
Here, I interpret v as the monitoring cost. In section 1.4, I provide a micro
foundation for v using the efficiency wage theory, which leads to firm size wage premium. However, since the efficiency wage leads to wage distribution for workers and
I am only interested in top income inequality, for the tractability of the model I start
with the reduced form model.6

1.2.2. The Equilibrium
Now, I am in a position to define an equilibrium.
Definition 1. For a given automation technology I, skill distribution G with support
[zmin , zmax ] and capital stock K̄ an equilibrium consists of prices {R, w}, the set of entrepreneurs E ⊂ [zmin , zmax ], automation technology I ? (z), labor and capital demand
{`?i (z)}i∈[I ? ,1] , {ks? (z)}s∈[0,I ? ) for z ∈ E such that:
• π(z) ≥ w for all z ∈ E;
• {`?i (z)}i∈[I ? ,1] , {ks? (z)}s∈[0,I ? ) , I ? (z) solves the entrepreneur’s problem (1.4);
• Labor market clears:

Z Z1

`?i (z)didG(z) = 1 − |E|;

E I ? (z)
?

Z IZ (z)
• Capital market clears:
ks? (z)dsdG(z) = K̄.
E

0

Proposition 1. For a given automation technology 0 < I < 1, capital stock K̄, and
skill distribution G with support [zmin , zmax ] ⊂ R+ , there exists a unique equilibrium.
6
What happens to v depends on the interpretation: it can be a part of the compensation scheme
for labor, or it can be an effort cost incurred by the entrepreneur. In the reduced-form model, I
assume v is incurred by the entrepreneur, in the model with efficiency wage v/L is paid to labor as
compensation to not shirk; however, our result does not depend on what happens to v.
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1.2.3. Characterization of the Equilibrium
I left the details of the characterization of the equilibrium in the appendix. Here, I
point out the main features.
Optimal Occupational Choice
It is easy to see that profit π(z) is increasing in z, hence there is a cutoff z ? such that
any individual with z > z ? becomes an entrepreneur and others become a worker.
Optimal Allocation of Capital and Labor of an Entrepreneur
An entrepreneur uses the same measure of labor in non-automated tasks and the same
measure of capital in automated tasks. To see this, consider the first-order conditions
of (1.4) with respect to `i and ks :
zY
= w + v0
[`i ] :
`i
zY
[ks ] :
=R
ks

Z

1



=⇒ `i = `j = ` ∀i, j ≥ I ? .

(1.5a)

=⇒ ks = kt = k ∀s, t < I ? .

(1.5b)

`i di
I?

The first condition equates the marginal product of labor in task i to the
marginal cost of labor. Since marginal cost is the same for each task that is not
automated, marginal products must be equalized across tasks. Hence, this condition implies that the measure of labor used in each task that is not automated is
the same. Similarly, the second condition implies that the capital used for each task
that is automated is the same. For automated tasks, this is easy to see. Since there
is no productivity difference between the tasks, an entrepreneur should be indifferent to allocating resources to each task, therefore he distributes the capital across
tasks uniformly. This is also true for labor because of the unit elasticity of substitution between tasks. Unit elasticity leads to the productivity of labor being in
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multiplicative form. Once the automation level is fixed, labor productivity behaves
as if it is total factor productivity. Formally, effective TFP becomes zC(I ? ), where
1

R
?
C(I ) = exp
lnγi di . Hence the productivity level of a task affects each task in
I?

the same way, and optimal labor is the same across non-automated tasks.
Optimal solution to the entrepreneur’s problem induces the output to Cobb?

?

Douglas looking function: zC(I ? )k I `1−I .
Optimal Automation Level of Entrepreneur
Now I characterize the optimal automation level of an entrepreneur. Taking the first
order condition of 1.4 with respect to I ? and imposing optimality condition for labor
and capital leads to the following equation:
Z1

lnγi di − (1 − I ? )lnγI ? + ln(z) = ln(R).

(1.6)

I?

The solution to this equation is the unconstrained optimal automation level,
I ? . The entrepreneur chooses I ? if it is less than the automation constraint I, otherwise, he chooses I. The solution only depends on the rental rate of capital R and the
skill of the entrepreneur, z. The wage rate does not affect the automation level, but it
affects the labor and capital decision, which is why it impacts the level of production
˜ be the solution to (1.6).
indirectly. Let I(z)
One thing to notice is that for low productive tasks, using labor might never
be optimal. Consider a low productive task i such that w/γi > R. Even without any labor, the effective cost of labor is higher than the capital. Therefore, the
entrepreneur does not have any incentive not to automate this task. So, all tasks
i < I := max{0, γ −1 (w/R)} are automated in the equilibrium, where γ −1 (x) is the
¯
task that has the labor productivity x.
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Proposition 2. Optimal choice of automation level, I ? (z) is increasing in z and
given by:




I




˜
I ? (z) = I(z)






I
¯

if z ≥ z̃,
if z < z < z̃,
¯

(1.7)

if z ≤ z .
¯

˜ = I and I(z
˜ ) = I.
where I(z̃)
¯
¯
Proposition 2 tells that more skilled entrepreneurs automate more tasks. The
reason is as follows: as discussed above, labor productivity appears like a TFP in
the optimal production, C(I ? ). Hence, there is a tradeoff for automation. On the
one hand, automation enables entrepreneurs to use the cheaper factor. On the other
hand, it decreases the productivity gain from the labor, C(I). Low-productive entrepreneurs automate less to benefit from total productivity. As z increases, the
benefit of labor productivity decreases, hence the entrepreneurs prefer cost-effective
inputs. Therefore, I ? is increasing in z. The reason is similar to the argument of Zeira
(1998). In a similar model, he studies technological adaptation across countries. He
shows that low productive countries have lower wages and hence lower technological
adoption. In our model, the wage rate is the same for all firms, the only difference is
productivity.

1.2.4. Top Income Distribution
Now, I can characterize the top income distribution. Individuals with skill level below
z ? become a worker and earn wage w and individuals with skill level above z ? become
entrepreneurs and earn profit π(z). Because π(z) ≥ w for entrepreneurs, the top
income percentile consists of entrepreneurs. As a result, I only need to characterize
the profit function for top income distribution.
Recall from the first order conditions that zY ? = k ? R and zY ? = `? (w +
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v 0 (L? )). If I multiply the first one with I ? and the second one with (1 − I ? ) and sum
them, I get:
zY ? = RI ? k ? + L? (w + v 0 (L? )).
Hence, the profit function is given by:
π(z) =zY ? − RI ? k ? − wL? − v(L? )
=v 0 (L? )L? − v(L? ).

In order to get a closed-form solution, I need more structure. Assume that
v(L) = Lα , where α > 1. Then:
π(z) = (α − 1)L?α .

Imposing functional form of v into entrepreneur’s problem gives us:
"
L(z) =

?

zC(I )
RI ?

 1−I1 ?

1
# α−1
1
  α−1
1
−w
.
α

Because I am interested in top income, consider high z. Suppose that z̄ > R, then
clearly automation technology binds for top skilled entrepreneurs. To see this, consider z > R. If he automates all tasks, then he has a linear production function and
makes an infinite profit. Hence, I binds for high enough z.
By plugging labor demand and I ? = I into the profit function, I get:
"
π(z) = (α − 1)

zC(I)
RI

1
 1−I

α
# α−1
α
  α−1
1
−w
.
α

(1.8)

The profit function is convex in z. I ∈ (0, 1) implies that 1/(1 − I) > 1. Simi-
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larly, α > 1 implies α/(α − 1) > 1. Convexity implies that there is a superstar effect
(Rosen, 1981): the profit is increasing in z disproportionately. A high productive
entrepreneur’s earning is much higher than a low productive one.
Observe that the convexity of profit function is increasing with automation
technology I. The reason for this is that automation constraint in the entrepreneur’s
problem binds stronger for high skilled than low skilled. Hence, once this constraint
is relaxed, the return is higher for a high skilled entrepreneur. For simplicity, consider
two entrepreneurs, one with high z so that automation technology binds and one with
low z that does not automate all automatable tasks. An increase in I does not affect
the choice of low z, whereas now a high z can enlarge its production and increase its
profit. Therefore, the value of relaxing the automation constraint is increasing at z.
This implies that an improvement in automation technology increases the convexity
of the profit function.
The convexity of profit function is also increasing with a reduction in the
monitoring cost, i.e. a decrease in α. The monitoring cost is the main reason behind
the decreasing returns to scale. As the monitoring problem is relaxed, entrepreneurs
can enlarge their span of control. Since the enlargement is bigger for high productive
entrepreneurs, this leads to an increase in the convexity of the profit function.
To characterize the distribution of profits, I need to know how productivity
z is distributed. It is well-known that the top income distribution of income is well
approximated by a Pareto distribution. Moreover, the power of a Pareto distribution
is also a Pareto distribution. Therefore, if z is Pareto distributed, then the convexity
of profit function implies that the distribution of profit has a Pareto tail.

Proposition 3. Suppose the distribution of entrepreneurial productivity, z, is Pareto
with shape parameter λ, monitoring cost function is v(L) = Lα , and λ(1 − I)(α −
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1) > 1.7 Then, the distribution of profits has a Pareto tail with shape parameter
.8
λ(1 − I) α−1
α
Pareto parameter gives us a measure for inequality (Gabaix, 2016). The lower
tail parameter means higher inequality. In this model, the Pareto parameter of the
profits has three components: entrepreneurial skill distribution (λ), the convexity of
the labor cost function (α), and the automation technology (I). Since (α − 1)/α < 1,
both automation and labor cost make income distribution thicker. As I increases or
α decreases, the Pareto parameter goes down, hence inequality at the top increases.
Here, decreasing returns comes from automation technology and labor cost.
As I discussed before, the convexity of the profit function increases with improvement
in I and decreases with α. This leads top skilled entrepreneurs to capture a higher
share of total profits. As the severity of the diseconomies of scale decreases, top
income inequality increases.
Under the assumption of the constant returns to scale profit function, only the
highest skilled entrepreneur produces and others would work for her since there is no
limit to scaling the production function. If everything can be automated, i.e. I = 1,
or there is no convex cost of labor, i.e. α = 1, then the profit function is constant
returns to scale. In such a situation there is no limit for entrepreneurs to scale up their
production, hence only the most productive person becomes an entrepreneur. Hence
as I goes up, inequality also increases because the limit on scaling up the production
lessened.
7

Proposition 1 can be extended to any unbounded distributions as long as the labor demand
remains finite. For the Pareto distribution, I need λ(1 − I)(α − 1) > 1 to have an equilibrium.
8
I say that the tail distribution of F is distributed by G if F (x)/G(x) → 1 as x → ∞. Observe
that including capital income, RK, does not impact the tail of income distribution of entrepreneurs.
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1.2.5. A Measure for Automation: Capital Share
I build our model using a task-based framework as in Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018b).
An implication of this type of production function is that I corresponds to the capital
share of income. This is also true in our model. To see this, consider the entrepreneur’s
first-order condition with respect to capital. It implies that the capital share of
production within a firm is I, I ? (z)zY = RI ? (z)k ? (z). If there is no entrepreneur
that automation level does not bind, then in the aggregate, capital share of income
is I:
Z

?

Z

I (z)zY (z)dG(z) =

RI ? (z)k ? (z)dG(z) =⇒ I = R

RK̄
.
zY (z)dG(z)

Therefore, the remaining part, 1 − I accrues to labor and entrepreneur.
Proposition 4. If automation technology binds for every entrepreneur, then the labor
share of income (wage share + entrepreneurial share) is 1 − I.
This enables us to measure the impact of automation on the Pareto parameter
using the labor share of income.

1.2.6. Back of Envelope Calculation
Now, I do back of an envelope calculation for the impact of the improvement in
automation technology on the change in the Pareto parameter of the top income
. I know that the
distribution. Recall that our theory states that β = λ(1 − I) α−1
α
labor share in the US decreased from around 64% to 59% from the 1970s to 2010s.
Assuming the Pareto parameter for skill distribution and the convexity of monitoring
cost function has not changed, i.e. all the decrease comes from the change in I, this
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implies that:
β̂2010
β̂1970

=

1 − I2010
≈ 0.92.
1 − I1970

In other words, the model predicts an 8% decrease in the Pareto parameter. In the
WID data, the estimated Pareto parameter decrease from 2 to 1.5 in the same period.
This corresponds to an approximately 25% decrease. In other words, our model can
explain a third of the decrease in the Pareto parameter.

1.3. Test for Empirical Predictions
1.3.1. Importance of Business Income
In this subsection, I discuss the importance of the change in the return to entrepreneurial skill for the dynamics of top income inequality.
Figure 1.2: Income Composition of Top 0.1%
0.6

0.4

0.2

0
1960

1970

1980
Business Income

1990

2000

2010

Salaries

Capital Income

Note: Capital gains are excluded.
Source: Piketty and Saez (2003).

Figure 1.2 shows the income composition of the top 0.1% (excluding capital
gains) across the last 50 years. The share of business income (solid line in the graph)
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has almost doubled since the 1960s. Together with wages and salaries, they account
for 80% of the income of top income earners (Piketty and Saez, 2003; Atkinson and
Lakner, 2017). Moreover, the major component of the increase in the top income
share can be accounted for by the increase in business income (Guvenen and Kaplan,
2017; Smith et al., 2019; Bakija, Cole, and Heim, 2012). 60% of the growth of income
share of top earners can be accounted for by managers, executives, entrepreneurs,
supervisors, and financial professionals (Bakija, Cole, and Heim, 2012). Therefore,
the change in the return to entrepreneurial skills is the main driver of the top income
inequality.

1.3.2. Automation and the Pareto Parameter
In this subsection, I test the main theory of the chapter. The implication of our main
result is that
logβ = logλ + log(1 − I) + log(α − 1) − log(α).
This implies that there is a one-to-one relationship between the Pareto parameter
and the labor share, 1 − I. The model predicts that a percentage increase in 1 − I
leads to a percentage increase of β.
I test this prediction with two different cases. First, I consider the industrylevel panel data for the US. Second, I consider the country-level panel data. To test
our theory, I regress estimate the following equation:

∆logβit = γ∆log(labor sharet ) + τ + ∆it ,

where i is industry or country, t is time, τ is time trend and ∆ is the first difference
operator. Under the assumption that skill distribution and monitoring cost remains
constant across time, our theory predicts that γ is equal to one.
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Measure for Labor Share
Labor share of income is defined as the total compensation of workers divided by the
total income. For the US industrial level data, I use the compensation of employees
as a share of the value-added GDP for each industry, using BEA’s industry-level GDP
data (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2018). For international level analysis, I use
the labor share estimates of Penn World Table 9.1 (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer,
2015). BEA’s data starts in 1987, therefore I consider the years between 1987 and
2005. For international comparison, I consider 1961-2005.
Observe that labor share in the model consists of two parts: wage and entrepreneurial income. Though, in reality, accounting for self-employment income is
not straightforward since it is hard to distinguish what fraction of income is returned
to entrepreneurial skill and what fraction is returned to own capital. How to incorporate self-employment income into factor share calculations is an important discussion
(Gollin, 2002). PWT divides self-employment income between labor and capital using
the split ratio in the corporate sector (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer, 2015).
Measure for Top Income Inequality
The main source of top income shares is the World Inequality Database (WID)9 . WID
relies on tax data and available for a wide range of countries. In the international
level evidence, I use data from WID. Specifically, I use pre-tax income (equally split
between spouses) shares for top 0.1% and top 1%.
I get relative income share from WID and then estimate the Pareto parameter
using the following relation:
ˆ = 10
RIS
9

1−β̂
β̂

I retrieved data from https://wid.world/.
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× 100.

Unfortunately, the tax data usually does not have information on the industry,
making it hard to get a good estimate of the top income share by industry. Therefore,
I use the CPS ASEC microdata extracted from IPUMS (Flood et al., 2018). As I
discussed before, business income is an important component of income for top income
earners and our model is also about business income. For this reason, I considered
the distribution of income of self-employment workers. Assuming that the right tail
of income distribution follows a Pareto distribution, I estimated the Pareto parameter
using the maximum likelihood estimator.
A major drawback of public use microdata is that the income is top coded
in the data. Since I am interested in the right tail of the income distribution, a
significant fraction of the observations is top-coded. In order to estimate the Pareto
parameter with top-coded data, I follow the strategy of Clemens et al. (2017). Let xi
be the income of person i and let x̄ be the top code. Observed income in the data is
then:
x̃i =




x

if xi ≤ x̄,

i



x̄

if xi > x̄.

Assume that income distribution after q th percentile is distributed by a Pareto
with shape parameter β. The maximum likelihood estimator for scale parameter is
q th percentile of the data. Let’s denote it by xq . Then maximum likelihood estimator
for the Pareto parameter is
"
β̂ = argmax Π

βxβq
xβ+1
i

!#Di

 x β(1−Di )
q

x̄

,

where Di indicated whether xi ≤ x̄ or not. Solution to this problem is
X  
 
1
xi
x̄
=
ln
+ Ncen ln
,
Nunc
xq
xq
β̂
1
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where Nunc is the number of uncensored observations and Ncen is the number of
censored observations.
One problem with this strategy is that there is not always enough observation
to consistently estimate the Pareto parameter. I only estimated the Pareto parameter
if there are more than 15 observations and I fit the Pareto distribution to distribution after the top 15th percentile. In total, I have 648 estimated parameters for 18
industries between the years 1970-2005.10
I take the 5-year averages to decrease the short-run fluctuations and to reduce
the noise of the data. And because the labor share series of BEA starts in 1987, I
end up having 4 observations for each industry.
Result
Table 1.1 shows the regression results. As can be seen, all of the coefficients are
positive and significant. This means that there is a positive correlation between the
labor share and the Pareto parameter, both at the industry level and at the country
level. Moreover, when I control for time trends, coefficients are very close to 1, as
predicted by the model. A percentage increase in the labor share increases the Pareto
parameter by one percent. In this regard, the data supports the main prediction of
the model.

1.3.3. Beyond Top Income Inequality
In this section, I discuss our model’s implications other than top income inequality.
CEO compensation: Even though our model is about entrepreneurs, it is
possible to consider entrepreneurs as CEOs also. In an extended model, if I assume
that there is a competitive market for CEOs and firms are competing to hire CEOs,
then Bertrand competition among firms leads the CEO to capture all the surplus.
10

I exclude utilities, public administration, and other services.
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Table 1.1: Impact of Labor Share on Pareto Parameter
log(Pareto Parameter)
US - Industry Level
log(Labor Share)
Time Trend
Nobs

Cross-country

1.002*

1.02*

1.33***

0.99**

(0.57)

(0.6)

(0.37)

(0.44)

-

0.01

-

-0.03**

-

(0.03)

-

(0.01)

46

46

198

198

∗

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Note: All standard errors are clustered at the industry or country level. Rows are independent
variables and columns are dependent variables. The Pareto parameters for industries are estimated
by fitting the Pareto parameter to top business income distribution using CPS ASEC data. The
Pareto parameters for countries are taken from World Inequality Database. The labor shares for
industries are taken from BEA. The labor shares for countries are taken from Penn World Table
version 9.1.

In this regard, the model predicts that an improvement in automation technology
leads to an increase in CEO compensation. Indeed, there is also a significant increase in CEO compensation in the US, especially between the mid-1970s and the
2000s(Frydman and Jenter, 2010). Median CEO compensation was $1.2 million in
the 1970s and it increased to $9.2 million in the 2000s.
Market concentration: Our model predicts that market concentration, either measured as top firms’ share in sales or employment, increases with automation.
Even though I did not prove formally, it is straightforward to see that top firms’ share
in sales and employment size is increasing with the automation level. Autor, Dorn,
et al. (2020) show that “superstar” firms are capturing a larger share of the market
and this phenomenon is more pronounced in the industries where labor share is falling
faster. Though, they interpret the increase in market power as an important driver
of the decrease in the labor share. In our model, the causality is reversed. Here,
automation leads to a decline in the labor share and an increase in market concentration. There is also a significant correlation between information technology (IT)
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intensity and market concentration (Brynjolfsson et al., 2008; Bessen, 2017). I believe
that IT is an important part of automation technology hence high IT intensity is an
implication of more automation. In this regard, these observations are consistent with
our model’s prediction on market concentration.
Decreasing Entrepreneurship Rate: One important margin in the model
is the occupational choice. An increase in automation technology has two counteracting impacts on the wage rate. Similar to Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018a), there
are replacement and productivity effects. First, as capital replaces labor, demand
for labor decreases, and this dampens the wage. Second, automation enables firms
to allocate workers to more productive tasks, therefore it increases productivity and
wages. Due to occupational choice, there is an additional effect in this model. Automation increases the return to entrepreneurial skill, hence it incentivizes workers
to become an entrepreneur. Depending on the change in the wage rate and return
to entrepreneurial skill, the marginal individual might change his occupation. In the
early stage of automation, the productivity effect dominates and hence the marginal
entrepreneur becomes a worker. In the later stage of automation, the replacement
effect dominates, and this reverses the decision of the marginal individual. Hence, it
is expected to see a decreasing business dynamism in the early stage of automation.
This is in line with the decrease in the start-up rate in the US (Decker et al., 2014;
Pugsley and Sahin, 2019; Salgado, 2019).

1.4. Endogenizing v: Efficiency Wage
In the previous section, I introduced a convex cost function for labor, v, as the source
of the diseconomies of scale, but did not provide why there is this additional cost
and why it is convex. In this section, I provide a micro foundation for v using the
efficiency wage theory similar to Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).
Suppose that time is continuous and there is a measure one of the risk-neutral
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individuals who discounts future with rate r > 0. Each individual has two types
of skills: labor and entrepreneurial skill. Labor skill is the same for all individuals,
whereas, entrepreneurial skill, denoted by z, is distributed with some cumulative
distribution function G. There is a fixed amount of capital, K̄. To avoid the capital
accumulation decision of individuals, I assume that capital is owned by outsiders.
Individuals can either become a worker or an entrepreneur. An entrepreneur
rents capital, hires labor to produce output and enjoys a profit, π(z). A worker can
be in one of two states at any point in time: employed or unemployed.

1.4.1. The Problem of the Worker
An employed worker earns a flow wage w until he is separated from the job. The
separation can happen in two ways: exogenous separation that happens with Poisson
rate δ or getting caught while shirking. A worker is monitored with a Poisson rate of
q. Hence, a worker who shirks leaves the job with Poisson rate δ + q, and a worker
who exerts effort leaves the job with Poisson rate δ.
Let U denotes the value of being unemployed, Ve (w, q) denotes the value of
exerting effort in a job that pays wage w and monitoring probability is q, and Vs (w, q)
denotes the value function for shirking on the job that pays wage w and monitoring
probability is q. Then, Ve and Vs satisfy the following equations:

rVs (w, q) =w + (δ + q) [U − Vs (w, q)] ,

(1.9a)

rVe (w, q) =w − c + δ [U − Ve (w, q)] ,

(1.9b)

where c is the cost of exerting effort.
An employed worker exerts effort if and only if Ve (w, q) ≥ Vs (w, q). This
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implies that the worker exerts effort if the wage rate satisfies:

w ≥ rU + c +

(r + δ)c
.
q

(NSC)

This is the so-called no-shirking condition. This condition says that the wage rate
should compensate for the disutility of working, rU +c. Moreover, there is a premium
to induce the worker to work, (r + δ)c/q.
An unemployed worker enjoys a flow unemployment benefit b and finds a job
with Poisson rate µ. Let x = (w, q) be the characteristics of the jobs. Then, U
satisfies the following equation:
Z
rU = b + µ

[max{V (x) − U, 0}] dF (x),

(1.10)

X

where X is the set of active firms characteristics, F is the distribution of job openings
and V (w, q) = max{Ve (w, q), Vs (w, q)}.

1.4.2. The Problem of the Entrepreneur
Now consider an entrepreneur. The entrepreneur has a limited ability to monitor
his employees. Assume that as the measure of employees increases, the probability of
being monitored for a single worker decreases, i.e. q(L) is a decreasing function of L.

11

The entrepreneur wants his employees to exert effort, otherwise, they produce nothing.
Therefore, he needs to take into account the moral hazard problem. An entrepreneur
with L labor needs to pay his workers w(L) such that Ve (w, q(L)) ≥ Vs (w, q(L)) so
11

In this model monitoring is only done by the entrepreneur. The monitoring cost is only important
if the entrepreneur cannot identify the shirking worker from the non-shirking one. Alternatively,
it might be possible to use a contract that depends on the performance of peers. This way, the
entrepreneur can incentivize her employees to monitor each other (Che and Yoo, 2001). Replacing
labor with capital would decrease peer monitoring, which might lead to a change in the compensation
scheme to induce workers to exert effort (Dogan and Yildirim, 2017). However, in this chapter, I
only consider monitoring entrepreneurs.
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that workers exert effort. In other words, at the optimum w should satisfy (NSC)
with equality. Hence, define the optimal wage policy as:

w(L) = rU + c +

(r + δ)c
.
q(L)

In this setting, the wage premium to induce a worker to exert effort is a function of
firm size: larger firms need to pay a higher wage.
The problem of an entrepreneur in this setting is:

π(z) =

max

I ? ,{`i }i∈[I ? ,1] ,
{ks }s∈[0,I ? )



Z1

zY − w 

ki di

`i di − R

`i di

I?

ZI ?

Z1
I?

(1.11)

0

s.t. 0 ≤ I ? ≤ I,
`i ≥ 0, k ≥ 0,

and the output is given by (1.3).
An individual would become an entrepreneur instead of a worker if π(z) ≥ rU .
Since π(z) is increasing in z, there exist a marginal entrepreneur z ? such that any
individual with z 0 > z ? becomes an entrepreneur.

1.4.3. Equilibrium
Definition 2. For a given automation technology I, skill distribution G with support
[zmin , ∞) and capital stock K̄, the steady state equilibrium of the economy consists of
prices {R, w(.)}, value functions {U, Ve (z), Vs (z), the marginal entrepreneur z ? , labor
and capital demand {`? (z), k ? (z)} for z ≥ z ? , automation technology I ? (z) for z ≥ z ? ,
matching process µ, vacancy distribution F , and unemployment u such that:
• Value functions satisfy (1.10), (1.9a),(1.9b);
• π(z ? ) = rU ;
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• `(z), k(z) and I ? (z) solve the entrepreneur’s problem (1.11);
• inflow to unemployment equals to outflow from unemployment: δ(G(z ? ) − u) =
µu;
• labor market clears:

R∞
(1 − I ? (z))`? (z)dG(z) = G(z ? ) − u;
z?

• capital market clears:

R∞

I ? (z)k ? (z)dG(z) = K̄;

z?

• wage function: w(L) = rU + c +
Rw

• vacancy posting: F (w) =

w
¯∞
R
w
¯

(δ+r)c
;
q(L)

g(z(w0 ))L(z(w0 ))
g(z(w0 ))L(z(w0 ))

dw0 for w ≥ w = w(L(z ? )),
¯




, i.e. entrepreneurial skill level that offers wage
where z(w) = L−1 q −1 w−c−rU
(r+δ)c
rate w, L−1 is the inverse function of labor demand and q −1 is the inverse of monitoring probability.

1.4.4. Characterization of the Income Distribution
I can separate the wage function in two components, fixed and variable part. Define
w0 = rU + c and wv (L) =

(r+δ)c
q(L)

so that w(L) = w0 + wv (L). The labor cost in this

setting can be mapped to the labor cost in previous setting by defining v(L) = wv (L)L.
Hence, if L/q(L) is convex, the entrepreneur’s problem would be the same in both
settings.
Even though nothing has changed on the entrepreneur’s side, the labor supply
side has changed. First, to discipline the workers, there must be unemployment.
Without unemployment, workers can immediately find a new job after being fired,
then there is no cost of being fired. Therefore, unemployment is needed to discourage
workers from shirking. Second, there is wage dispersion. In the previous section, I
assumed v as a waste; in contrast, here I assume that it is paid to the workers as
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compensation. Since monitoring in larger firms is harder, an entrepreneur with a
larger labor force needs to pay more to provide workers an incentive to exert effort.
Therefore, the firm size distribution would lead to wage dispersion.
To characterize distributions, I need more structure. Recall that q(L) is the
probability that a worker is being monitored. One intuitive way to define q is to think
that the entrepreneur randomly selects workers and monitors them. Let M denote
the measure of workers that an entrepreneur can monitor in a given time. Then, the
Poisson rate that a worker in a firm with L employees is monitored is q(L) = M/L.
This leads to v(L) = M L2 , in other words letting α = 2 in the previous setting would
give the same entrepreneur’s problem. Therefore, similar results follow in this setting:

Corollary 1. If z follows a Pareto distribution with parameter λ, then for large
enough π, profit distribution can be approximated by Pareto distribution with parameter λ(1 − I)/2.
As I discussed, there is going to be wage dispersion even for workers. Since
there is a one-to-one relation between wage level and firm size, wage distribution
mimics the firm size distribution:

Corollary 2. If z follows a Pareto distribution with parameter λ, then for large
enough w, wage distribution can be approximated by Pareto distribution with parameter λ(1 − I).
Observe that only the curvature of q(L) is important for profit distribution.
In this formulation, the efficiency of monitoring, M , does not have an impact on the
tail parameter. If an entrepreneur can monitor a higher measure in a given time, this
would not change the convexity of the profit function. Therefore, if I think M as the
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monitoring technology or communication technology as in Garicano (2000), then it
has no impact on top income inequality. On the other hand, automation technology
I still has the same impact on the right tail of the income distribution. Furthermore,
now it not only impacts profit distribution but also leads to thicker wage distribution.

1.5. Conclusion
After the 1980s, income distribution in the US has become more skewed. While
rich people have been getting richer, the super-rich has become even more so. In
this chapter, I argue that improvements in automation technology contributed to the
widening gap between the top earners. Our theory states that if the cost of labor is
convex, then entrepreneurs have decreasing returns to scale production function. As
automation technology improves, dependence on labor deteriorates and the importance of convex cost decreases. This lessens the severity of diseconomies of scale and
increases the return to entrepreneurial skill. Therefore, income inequality among the
top earners’ increases. Using industry-level data for the US and cross-country data,
I provide evidence that an improvement in automation technology leads to a lower
Pareto parameter.
According to our model, the Pareto parameter of top income distribution is
a function of three parameters: automation level, skill distribution, and convexity of
labor cost. In this chapter, I discussed the impact of the change in automation level,
because I know for a fact that automation has increased. However, I believe that the
other two parameters are also important and need attention.
I provide one explanation for the convex cost of labor: efficiency wage. However, any theory that leads to firm size premiums should deliver similar results. It is
shown that firm size wage premium is decreasing, the gap between large firms and
small firms is decreasing (Bloom et al., 2018; Cobb and Lin, 2017). This might be a
piece of evidence that monitoring cost is decreasing, hence it also contributing to top
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income inequality.
Even though I see this chapter as a model of automation, the model is open
to other ways of interpretation. With slight modification (by specifying the supply
and price of the outsourcing), it can be seen as a model of outsourcing. I believe that
outsourcing is an important subject as automation and it is crucial to distinguish
them. Unfortunately, this chapter remains short in that aspect.
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1.A. Online Appendix
Lemma 1. If wage rate w(L) is strictly increasing in L and positive, then w(L)L is
strictly convex.
Proof. Let L1 > L2 and define Lλ = λL1 + (1 − λ)L2 for some λ ∈ (0, 1). Suppose
w(L)L is not is not convex, then there exist λ ∈ (0, 1) such that

w(Lλ )Lλ ≥ λw(L1 )L1 + (1 − λ)w(L2 )L2
(1 − λ)[w(Lλ ) − w(L2 )]L2 ≥ λ[w(L1 ) − w(Lλ )]L1 .

Since w(L) is strictly increasing and positive, w(Lλ ) > w(L1 ) and w(Lλ ) < w(L2 ).
This implies that left hand size is negative and right hand size is positive. Hence, it
leads to a contradiction. This prooves that w(L)L is a convex function.



1.A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
In order to prove the existence and the uniqueness of equilibrium, first I consider a
constraint problem, in which the cutoff for being an entrepreneur is fixed. In such
a setting, I show that there exists a cutoff skill level z̄ such that for z > z̄ there
exist no positive prices that clear labor and capital market at the same time. This
allows us to bind the set of skill levels. Then, I show that there exist z ? such that the
market-clearing wage rate and profit for the cutoff entrepreneur are the same, hence
z ? together with associated wage and rental rate constitute the equilibrium.
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For a given prices {w, R}, labor demand for entrepreneur z is the solution to
1


1/(1−I ? (z))
R
zC(I ? (z))
0
v (L(z)) =
− w, where C(I) = exp
lnγi . Since v is twice
?
RI (z)
I

continuously differentiable and strictly convex, inverse of v 0 exists. Define φ := v 0−1 .
For ease of notation, I drop argument for I ? (z) and write it as I ? . Define M (R, z) =
 1

zC(I ? ) 1−I ?
. Since labor demand is decreasing with R, and increasing with z, MR <
RI ?
0, Mz > 0, where Mi is partial derivative with respect to i.
Observe that boundary condition for labor demand is not satisfied, i.e. for
a given positive R as the wage rate converges to 0 labor demand does not diverge.
Therefore, a decrease in the wage rate might not be sufficient to clear the market. I
am going to consider this boundary case to find when markets are not going to clear.
The labor market and capital market clearing conditions when the cutoff skill
is z 0 are:
zZmax

φ [M (R, z) − w] dG(z) = G(z ? ),

z̃
zZmax

M (R, z)
I?
φ [M (R, z) − w]
dG(z) = K̄,
?
1−I
R

(1.12a)

(1.12b)

z̃
?

?

where z̃ = max{z 0 , w1−I RI /C(I ? )} is the least productive active entrepreneur, given
prices {R, w}, i.e. M (R, z̃) = w if z̃ 6= z 0 . Anyone above z̃ hires positive mass of
labor, and anyone below z̃ does not hire.
Define R` (w, z 0 ) as the labor market clearing rental rate when the wage is w
and individuals with z > z 0 are entrepreneurs. Define similar object Rk (w, z 0 ) for the
capital market. Observe that both R` (w, z) and Rk (w, z) are decreasing in z, since
an increase in z decreases the total demand, but does not decrease the supply, hence
R must decrease for a fixed wage. The intersection of these two curves is the rental
rate that clears both markets for a given w and z 0 .
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Observe that boundary condition for labor demand is not satisfied, i.e. for
a given positive R as the wage rate converges to 0 labor demand does not diverge.
Therefore, a decrease in the wage rate might not be sufficient to clear the market. I
am going to consider this boundary case to find when markets are not going to clear.
Now I show that there exist unique z̄ such that R` (0, z̄) = Rk (0, z̄). To do
this, first I show that Rk (0, z) is bounded above, whereas R` (0, z) is not. Second, I
show that for high enough z, Rk (0, z) > R` (0, z), hence, by the intermediate value
theorem, they must intersect. Lastly, I show that at the point where they intersect,
derivative of R` is higher than Rk , i.e. around z̄, R` (0, z̄) − Rk (0, z̄) is decreasing, so
that they can only intersect once. Notice that z̃ = z 0 when the wage rate is zero.
Lemma 2. As z → zmin , R` (0, z) → ∞, and Rk (0, z) → t < ∞.
Proof.

Let z → zmin . Suppose the contrary, R` (0, z) → p < ∞, and p > 0.

Take small  > 0, by continuity of R` (0, z), there exist δ > 0, such that R` (0, z 0 ) ∈
(p − δ, p + δ) for any z 0 ∈ (zmin , zmin + ). Define k := φ [M (p + δ, zmin ] > 0. Let z 0 be
such that (1 − G(z 0 ))k > G(z 0 ), and z 0 ∈ (zmin , zmin + ). Because k > 0 = G(zmin ),
such z 0 exists. Since R` (z 0 ) < p + δ and labor demand is decreasing with R, labor
demand for each z is higher than k. Hence, for small enough z 0 :
zZmax

Z∞

φ [M (R` , z)] dG(z) >
z0

kdG(z) = (1 − G(z 0 ))k > G(z 0 ),

z0

which contradicts that R` clears the market. Therefore, with a finite R` , the labor
market cannot be cleared. Hence R` (0, z) → ∞ as z → zmin .
Now consider the capital market condition (1.12b) when z ? = zmin . As Rk
converges to zero, demand goes to infinity, and as Rk diverges, demand converges to
0. Hence, there exist Rk (0, zmin < ∞ that clears the capital market. By continuity,
Rk (0, z) → R(0, zmin ) as z → zmin .
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Since R` (0, z) diverges and Rk (0, z) converges to some positive number as
z → zmin , this implies that for low enough z, R` (0, z) > Rk (0, z). I now show that
inequality must be flipped for high enough z.
Lemma 3. For high enough z 0 , Rk (0, z 0 ) > R` (0, z 0 ).
Observe that as z 0 → zmax , R` (0, z 0 ) and Rk (0, z 0 ) converge to 0. To see

Proof.

this, for a positive R, both total labor demand and total capital demand converges to
0, in contrast capital supply is fixed and labor supply converges to 1. Hence, R` and
Rk converge to 0 in order to clear the market. As Rk converges to 0, I ? converges to
I, every entrepreneur automates all possible tasks. Then, capital demand is:
I
− 1
Rk 1−I
1−I
−

zZmax

1

φ [M (Rk , z) − w] (zC(I)) 1−I dG(z) = K̄.
z0

1

Since Rk 1−I diverges, it must be the case that integral converges to 0 in order to have
1

1

finite demand. Observe that φ(M (R, z))(zC(I)) 1−I > φ(M (R, z))(zmin C(I)) 1−I > 0
for z > zmin . Therefore,
zZmax

φ [M (Rk , z)] (zC(I))
z0

1
1−I

zZmax

1

φ [M (Rk , z)] (zmin C(I)) 1−I dG(z) → 0.

dG(z) >
z0

However, labor demand must be equal to labor supply G(z 0 ), close to 1 for large
z 0 . Hence, for large enough z 0 , it must be the case that:
zZmax

1≈

zZmax

φ [M (R` , z)] dG(z) >
z0

φ [M (Rk , z)] dG(z) ≈ 0.

(1.13)

z0

Since M is decreasing in R, it must be the case that R` (0, z 0 ) < Rk (0, z 0 ) for large z 0 .
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Lemma 4. Let R` (0, z̄) = Rk (0, z̄). Then |R`0 (0, z̄)|> |Rk0 (0, z̄)|. In other words,
R` (0, z̄) − Rk (0, z̄) is decreasing around z̄.
Proof.

Let R` (0, z̄) = Rk (0, z̄) = R̃. Using implicit function theorem, taking

derivative of labor market condition (1.12a) with respect to z̄ gives us:
xZmax
h
i
h
i
−φ M (R̃, z̄) g(z̄) +
φ0 M (R̃, z) MR (R̃, z)R`0 (z̄)dG(z) = g(z̄).

(1.14)

z̄

Similarly, derivative of capital market condition with respect to z̄ is:
!
h
i M (R̃, z̄)
I ? (z̄)
0=−
φ M (R̃, z̄)
g(z̄)
1 − I ? (z̄)
R̃
zZmax"
h
i
I?
M (R̃, z)
0
+
φ
M
(
R̃,
z)
MR (R̃, z)Rk0 (z̄)
?
1−I
R
z̄

h
i M (R̃, z)R0 (z̄)R̃ − M (R̃, z)R0 (z̄)
I?
R
k
k
φ
M
(
R̃,
z)
2
1 − I?
# R̃
h
i
? 0
I R (z̄)
M (R̃, z)
+ R k ? 2 φ M (R̃, z)
dG(z).
(1 − I )
R̃

+

Recall that I ? (z) is decreasing in R, hence IR? ≤ 0. Since Rk0 < 0, the last term
of the integrand is positive for all z. Similarly, the second term of the integrand is
also positive, since MR < 0. Therefore:
!
h
i M (R̃, z̄)
I ? (z̄)
φ M (R̃, z̄)
g(z̄)
1 − I ? (z̄)
R̃
#
zZmax"
h
i
I?
M
(
R̃,
z)
dG(z).
>
φ0 M (R̃, z) MR (R̃, z)Rk0 (z̄)
1 − I?
R
z̄

Moreover, I ? /(1 − I ? ) and M (R, z) are increasing in z. I can simplify the
above expression by replacing them with I ? (z̄)/(1 − I ? (z̄)) and M (R, z̄) :
#
zZmax"
h
i
h
i
φ M (R̃, z̄) g(z̄) >
φ0 M (R̃, z) MR (R̃, z)Rk0 (z̄) dG(z).
z̄
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Using derivative of labor market condition, equation (1.14):
Z∞

#
Z∞ " h
i
h
i
φ0 M (R̃, z) MR (R̃, z)Rk0 (z̄) dG(z),
φ0 M (R̃, z) MR (R̃, z)R`0 (z̄)dG(z) >

z̄

Z∞

z̄

h

i

φ0 M (R̃, z) MR (R̃, z)(R`0 (z̄) − Rk0 (z̄))dG(z) > 0.

z̄

Which implies that R`0 (z̄) − Rk0 (z̄) < 0, since φ0 > 0 and MR < 0. In other
words, if R̃ clears both labor and capital market, when I increase z, rental rate that
clears the labor market decreases much faster than capital market.



Lemma 5. There exists a unique z̄, such that R` (0, z̄) = Rk (0, z̄)
Proof. Lemma 2 shows that R` (0, z) > Rk (0, z) for low z, and lemma 3 shows that
R` (0, z) < Rk (0, z) high z, therefore, they must intersect. Lemma 4 shows that they
can at most intersect once, since at the point they intersect, R` (0, z̄) − Rk (0, z̄) is
decreasing. If they intersect once more, then it must be the case that the difference is
increasing in the second intersection. Hence z̄ exists and it is unique.



Now, I prove that for z ? < z̄, there exist positive prices that clear the market.
Lemma 6. For z ? < z̄, there exist w > 0 and R > 0 that labor market condition,
equation (1.12a), and capital market condition, equation (1.12b), hold.
Proof. First, notice that R` (w, z ? ) and Rk (w, z ? ) are decreasing in w. To see this,
assume w increases but R does not decrease, z̃ weakly increases by definition and
demand strictly decreases for each entrepreneur. But then market conditions cannot
be satisfied. Therefore, Ri (w, z ? ) must be strictly decreasing in w. Since z ? < z̄,
R` (0, z ? ) > Rk (0, z ? ). I need to show that for large enough w, Rk (w, z ? ) > R` (w, z ? ).
Observe that as w diverges, R converges to 0, otherwise market clearing condition cannot be satisfied. As R converges to 0, automation technology binds for
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everyone: I ? → I. Using the similar argument with proof of lemma 3:

G(z ? ) =

zZmax

"

zZmax

#

"

#

φ M (Rk , z) − w dG(z) → 0,

φ M (R` , z) − w dG(z) >
z̃k

z̃`

where z̃i = max{z ? , w1−I RiI /C}. If R` ≥ Rk , M (R` , z ? ) ≤ M (Rk , z ? ) and z̃` ≥ z̃k .
Therefore, above inequality cannot hold. Hence Rk (w, z ? ) > R` (w, z ? ) for large enough
w. Using the intermediate value theorem, continuity of R` and Rk implies that there
exist w? > 0 such that R` (w? , z ? ) = Rk (w? , z ? ).
Using similar argument with the proof of lemma 4, one can easily show that
R` (w, z ? ) − Rk (w, z ? ) is decreasing around w? , hence R` and Rk can at most intersect
once. Therefore, prices are unique for a given z ? .



Lemma 7. For z ? > z̄, there do not exist positive prices that clear the market.
Proof. As I discussed in the previous lemma, Rk and R` can only intersect if R` >
Rk for low wage rates, since R` cross Rk from above. However, R` (0, z ? ) < Rk (0, z ? )
since , z ? > z̄. Therefore, they cannot intersect when w > 0.



Up to now, I know that for any z ∈ (zmin , z̄], there exist unique prices
w(z), R(z) that clears the market. To find the equilibrium, I need z ? to be indifferent
between occupations, i.e. π(z ? |R(w? ), w(w? )) = w(z ? ) where π(z|R(w), w(w)) is the
profit of entrepreneur with skill z when prices are {R, w}. Clearly, if there are inactive
entrepreneurs, then it cannot be equilibrium. Recall that an entrepreneur with skill
level z 0 is inactive if M (R(z), z 0 ) < 0 = w(z). Let’s define A := {z|M (R(z), z) >
w(z), z ≤ z̄}, so that z ∈ A implies every entrepreneur is active when z is cutoff
entrepreneur.
Lemma 8. There exists z0 ∈ (zmin , z̄), such that for z < z0 , there exist inactive
entrepreneurs, and for z > z̄, every entrepreneur is active.
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Proof.

Let z 0 ∈ A. If M (R(z 0 ), z 0 ) − w(z 0 ) is increasing around z 0 , then z 00 > z 0

implies z 00 ∈ A. To show M (R(z 0 ), z 0 )−w(z 0 ) is increasing take derivative with respect
to z 0 :
dM/dz = MR Rz + Mz − wz .
Since Mz is positive, it is sufficient to show that MR Rz − wz is positive. Now consider
labor market clearing condition. By definition, z˜0 = z 0 . Then:
zZmax

"

#
0

0

φ M (R(z ), z) − w(z ) dG(z) = G(z 0 ).

z0

Derivative with respect to z 0 leads to:
zZmax "

#

φ0 M (R(z 0 ), z) − w(z 0 ) (MR (R(z 0 ), z)Rz − wz ) dG(z)

z0

"

#

= g(z 0 ) + φ M (R(z 0 ), z 0 ) − w(z 0 )
> 0.
Claim 1.

∂M (R,z)
∂R∂z

< 0.

Proof. Suppose I ? (z) < I, then M (R, z) = RγI ? . Then:
∂M (R, z)
?
= γI0 ? Iz? + RγI00? IR? Iz? + RγI ? IRz
.
∂R∂z
Recall that optimal I ? solves the following equality:
Z1

lnγi − (1 − I ? )lnγI ? = ln(R/z).

I?

Using implicit function theorem twice, one for derivative of R, and second for deriva-
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tive of z, I could get:
?
.
−γI ? Iz? = −Iz? RγI0 ? IR? + (1 − I ? )RγI00? Iz? IR? + (1 − I ? )RγI0 ? IRz

By rearranging, one can get:
∂M (R, z)
= Iz? RγI0 ? IR? − IγI0 ? Iz? < 0
∂R∂z
since Iz? > 0, IR? < 0 and γI ? > 0.
Now suppose technology binds, hence M (R, z) = (ZC/RI )1/(1−I) . Since I does
not change with small changes in R and z, it is straight forward to show that MRz < 0.

By claim 1, MR is decreasing in z, hence MR (R(z 0 ), z 0 ) > MR (R(z 0 ), z) for
z > z 0 . φ is strictly increasing, hence derivative is positive. Thus

0

0

zZmax

"
0

#
0

0

φ M (R(z ), z) − w(z ) dG(z) > 0.

(MR (R(z ), z )Rz − wz )
z0

Therefore, it must be the case that MR (R(z 0 ), z 0 )Rz − wz is positive, which implies
that M (R(z 0 ), z 0 ) − w(z 0 ) is increasing. Define z0 := inf A. M (R(z), z) − w(z) is
increasing implies that A is connected, for z ∈ A ⇐⇒ z̄ ≥ z > z0 , if such z0 exists.
Next, I show that z0 exists and is in (zmin , z̄).B y definition, M (R(z̄), z̄) > 0 =
w(z̄), hence z̄ ∈ A. Continuity of R, w, M implies that z0 < z̄.
To show z0 > zmin , suppose the contrary. Notice that as z → zmin , labor supply shrinks, so demand converges to 0. Hence, it cannot be possible that
both R(z) and w(z) converges to a finite number, which leads to positive labor demand. Since Rk (0, z) < ∞ by lemma 2, it must be the case that w(z) → ∞ and
R(z) → 0 as z → zmin . Since, by assumption, every entrepreneur is active, then
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z ? > w1−I RI /C, hence w1−I RI /C is finite . However, this implies that the labor dei
h
1/(1−I) −(w 1−I RI )1/(1−I)
, diverges. Therefore, w1−I RI must diverge, which
mand, φ (zC)
RI/(1−I)
implies for small z, there are inactive entrepreneurs. Hence z0 > zmin .



Proposition 1. For a given automation technology 0 < I < 1, capital stock K̄, and
skill distribution G with support [zmin , zmax ] ⊂ R+ , there exists a unique equilibrium.
Proof.

By lemma 6 and 7, and due to the fact that every entrepreneur is active

in the equilibrium, I know that z ? ∈ (z0 , z̄). Define profit of cutoff entrepreneur as
π̃(z) = π(z|R(z), w(z)). z ? , R(z ? ), w(z ? ) is equilibrium if π̃(z ? ) = w(z ? ). Optimality
conditions imply

π̃(z) = v 0 [M (R(z), z) − w(z)] φ [M (R(z), z) − w(z)] − v(φ [M (R(z), z) − w(z)]).

Derivative with respect to z gives us :
[M (R(z), z) − w(z)] φ0 [M (R(z), z) − w(z)] [MR Rz + Mz − wz ] > 0

where first term is positive since z ∈ A, second term is positive because φ is increasing
and last term is positive by lemma 8. Therefore, π̃ is strictly increasing in (z0 , z̄),
with π̃(z0 ) = 0 and π̃(z̄) > 0.
On the other hand, w(z̄) = 0 by definition, and w(z0 ) > 0 by lemma 6. By the
intermediate value theorem and continuity of π̃(z) and w(z), they must intersect.
To show that it is unique, I want to show that w(z) is decreasing in z. Fix z 0
and w0 = w(z 0 ). Take the derivative of the market clearing conditions with respect to
z fixing w constant, around R` (w0 , z 0 ) and Rk (w0 , z 0 ). Using similar idea to lemma 4,
one can get:
Z0

φ0 MR (R`0 (w0 , z 0 ) − Rk (w0 , z 0 )) > 0.

z
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Since MR is negative, it must be the case that (R`0 − Rk0 ) < 0. By definition of
derivative, this implies that:
R` (w0 , z 0 + ) − Rk (w0 , z + )
<0

for small  > 0. But then, R` and Rk cannot intersect at w >≥ w0 , since R` (w, z) −
Rk (w, z) must be decreasing in w around market clearing wage rate. This implies that
w(z) is strictly decreasing.
This concludes that w(z) and π̃ intersects only once, hence the equilibrium is
unique.



1.A.2. Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3. Suppose the distribution of entrepreneurial productivity, z, is Pareto
with shape parameter λ, monitoring cost function is v(L) = Lα , and λ(1 − I)(α −
1) > 1.12 Then, the distribution of profits has a Pareto tail with shape parameter
λ(1 − I) α−1
.13
α
Proof. The distribution of profit Π = π(z) is given by:
" 
#λ(1−I)
 α−1
α
π
RλI
P (Π > π) = D α
+w
.
α−1
Cλ
By dividing to D̃π λ(1−I)

α−1
α

(1.15)


λ(1−I)
, where D̃ = DRλI /C(I)λ α/(α − 1)(α−1)/α
,

I can get:
P (Π > π)
D̃π λ(1−I)

α−1
α

"
= 1+

w(α − 1)
απ

α−1
α

α−1
α

#λ(1−I)
→ 1 as π → ∞.

12
Proposition 1 can be extended to any unbounded distributions as long as the labor demand
remains finite. For the Pareto distribution, I need λ(1 − I)(α − 1) > 1 to have an equilibrium.
13
I say that the tail distribution of F is distributed by G if F (x)/G(x) → 1 as x → ∞. Observe
that including capital income, RK, does not impact the tail of income distribution of entrepreneurs.

49

Hence Π ∼ P areto(λ(1 − I) α−1
).
α
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CHAPTER 2:
AUTOMATION AND TOP WEALTH INEQUALITY
by Ömer Faruk Koru

2.1. Introduction
Over the last 50 years, there has been a substantial increase in wealth concentration
in the US (as documented by Saez and Zucman (2016) and others). Figure 2.1 below
shows the share of wealth owned by the top 1% and the top 0.1% based on data from
the World Inequality Database.1 Since the 1960s, the wealth share of the top 1%
increased from 27% to 36.5%. A more striking growth had occurred in the wealth
share of the top 0.1%: it doubled from 9% to 18%. There is an ongoing debate both in
the public and academic spheres about the causes of this rise in wealth concentration.
In this chapter, I analyze the impact of automation on the increase in wealth
concentration. Specifically, I consider two channels through which automation impacts the share of the top 1%: a rise in income concentration due to higher return
to entrepreneurial productivity; and an increase in the dispersion of the return to
capital. I the model, the increase in automation explains one-fourth of the rise in the
wealth share of the top 1% in the US.
I use the term automation in a broad sense that includes robots and machines
as well as computers and software. During the last 50 years, automation technology
has significantly increased. For example, the mid-70s, when the top wealth shares
started to increase, was the dawn of the information technology (IT) revolution, when
the usage of computers and software in the production of a wide range of industries
started to take off. While automation substitutes some workers and suppresses their
1

https://wid.world/wid-world/.
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Figure 2.1: Top Wealth Shares
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Note: The orange line plots the share of wealth owned by the top 1%. The green line plots the
share of wealth owned by the top 0.1%.
Source: World Inequality Database.

wages, it generates a higher return to individuals who own the capital and a higher
return to individuals who use this automation technology. Hence, automation is an
important factor that affects inequality.
In this chapter, I make two contributions to the literature. First, I introduce
the concept of automation technology by incorporating a task-based production function and a convex labor cost into an Aiyagari model that features entrepreneurs and
a financial friction, as in Quadrini (2000) and Cagetti and De Nardi (2006). I model
the financial friction as a collateral constraint: entrepreneurs can only borrow up to
a fraction of their own assets. I show that automation affects top wealth inequality
through two channels: it increases income concentration, and it increases the dispersion of the return to capital. Second, I quantify the impact of automation on top
wealth inequality by calibrating the model and analyzing the exogenous improvement
in automation. I focus on entrepreneurs because business capital is an important part
of the assets of the wealthiest individuals. Almost half of individuals at the top 1% of
wealth distribution and income distribution own a business, and they hold one-third
of their wealth in their businesses (Kuhn and Rıéos-Rull, 2016; Smith, Yagan, et al.,
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2019). I model the financial friction as the collateral constraint; in other words, entrepreneurs can only borrow up to a fraction of their assets for their businesses. As
documented by Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), around one-third of entrepreneurs use
their assets as collateral for a business loan and almost one-fifth of entrepreneurs are
denied credit. For this reason, I use collateral constraints to model the incomplete
market for entrepreneurs.
I depart from the canonical model of Aiyagari by changing the production
function. First, to include automation decisions, I use a task-based framework, as
in Zeira (1998) and Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018). To produce the final good,
entrepreneurs need to complete a measure of one of the tasks. There are two types
of tasks: automated and non-automated. If a task is automated, then it can be done
using capital. On the other hand, if the task is not automated, then only labor can
be used to produce that task. Entrepreneurs choose what tasks to automate and
this provides a notion of automation choice in the model. The automation level is
defined as the share of tasks that can be automated and it is exogenously given.
I analyze how an exogenous shift in the share of automated tasks impacts wealth
concentration. Second, I introduce a convex cost of labor, similar to the first chapter of
this dissertation. This convex cost of labor leads to a production function that exhibits
decreasing returns to scale. In contrast to the literature that defines the decreasing
returns to scale over total production, this modeling decision links the severity of
diseconomies of scale in the entrepreneurial sector to automation technology. By
decreasing the dependency on labor, automation reduces the convexity of the cost
function and, hence the severity of diseconomies of scale. Because the decreasing
returns to scale property of the production function is related to the span-of-control
of entrepreneurs (Lucas, 1978), and the span-of-control is usually measured as the
number of employees (Ouchi and Dowling, 1974), it is intuitive to link the scalability
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to the number of employees. The convex cost of labor achieves this.
An improvement in automation technology has two impacts on wealth concentration. The first impact occurs through the change in the top of the income
distribution. Because automation decreases the severity of diseconomies of scale, it
increases the return to entrepreneurial skill. As I show in the first chapter in a static
model with the same production function, when entrepreneurial productivity is distributed by a Pareto distribution, the tail of income distribution can be approximated
with a Pareto tail, and the shape parameter is inversely related to the automation
level. As automation technology improves, dependency on labor diminishes. This
enables highly productive entrepreneurs to scale up their production more than less
productive entrepreneurs. This leads to the more pronounced superstar effect of
Rosen (1981) and, hence, to higher-income concentration. This implies that an improvement in automation technology increases the return to the “superstar” stage
and, hence, it increases wealth concentration.
The second impact of an improvement in automation on wealth concentration
is through the increase in the dispersion of return to capital. An improvement in
automation increases the demand for capital. However, if the collateral constraint is
binding before the improvement, now the constraint will become even tighter. Hence,
the return to business capital increases, therefore the incentive to save increases.
Clearly, this increase in the return to business capital is higher for more productive entrepreneurs, because among them the demand for capital increases more than
among low-productivity entrepreneurs. This leads to a higher dispersion in the return
to capital, and that, in turn, leads to an increase in wealth concentration.
One implication of the model is that automation increases the capital intensity of firms, average firm size, and the employment share of the largest firms. Using
data on European private firms, I document that in industries in which IT intensity
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increased at a higher rate, there is a higher increase in average firm size, average capital intensity, and employment concentration. The model can generate this positive
relation between automation and firm size distribution.
To quantify the impact of automation on wealth inequality, I calibrate the
model to the 1968 US economy. I analyze the impact of an unexpected improvement
in automation technology and measure the change in the wealth share of the top 1%.
An implication of the task-based framework is that the capital share of income is
a function of the automation level (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018; Martinez, 2019).
Similarly, in this model, the capital share of income equals the automation level.
Hence, I use the capital share as a measure of the automation level. The model can
match the initial steady-state well. When I increase the automation level to the 2016
level, the wealth share of the top 1% increases in the new steady-state by 8.82%,
which contrasts with a 34.6% increase in the data. Thus, the model can explain
one-fourth of the increase in the wealth share of the top 1%.
On the other hand, in the model, the wealth share of the top 0.1% increases
by 10%. However, in reality, it doubled. In other words, the model can only explain
10% of the increase in wealth concentration at the very top. One reason why the
model cannot generate high dynamics at the top is that the second channel is not
relevant to very wealthy individuals. Because the collateral constraint does not bind
for those individuals, an improvement in automation does not lead to a higher return
to business capital. Therefore, the model does not generate this additional incentive
to save among the top 0.1%.
Who gained from improvements in automation technology? To answer this
question, I calculate the transition dynamics after the unexpected automation shock.
I assume that automation technology increased at a constant rate for 45 years and
remained constant afterward. In consumption equivalence terms, workers’ welfare
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increased by 4%, and entrepreneurs’ welfare increased by 8%. The gain occurred
primarily because of the increase in overall productivity in the economy, which can
be attributed to the shift of the labor force to more productive firms.
Related Literature: This chapter is related to the literature on the impact of automation on the labor market. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020) provide
evidence for the impact of industrial robots on employment. Autor and Dorn (2013),
and Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2014) study the job polarization attributable
to routine-biased-technological change. Hémous and Olsen (2018), and Prettner and
Strulik (2019) consider the income inequality. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) Martinez (2019), and Eden and Gaggl (2018) analyze the effect on the labor share of
income of improvements in automation technology. In this chapter, I focus on the
impact of automation on wealth concentration.
The second strand of literature that this chapter contributes is the literature
on the dynamics of top wealth distribution. Piketty (2014), Saez and Zucman (2016),
Kopczuk (2015), Kuhn and Rıéos-Rull (2016), and Smith, Zidar, and Zwick (2020)
document the increase in wealth concentration using the capitalization method, estate
tax, and survey data. Hubmer, Krusell, and Smith Jr (2020), Kaymak and Poschke
(2016), Cao and W. Luo (2017), and Aoki and Nirei (2017) study various channels
that affect top wealth inequality.
Kaymak and Poschke (2016) consider the impact of the increase in wage inequality and the decrease in marginal tax rates. They claim that the increase in
wage inequality is the main driver of top wealth inequality because the impact of
the tax change is offset by the change in prices. In their analysis, they feed the observed change in wage inequality into the model, whereas in this chapter the change
in income concentration is a result of the change in the automation technology.
Hubmer, Krusell, and Smith Jr (2020), Cao and W. Luo (2017) and Aoki and
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Nirei (2017) show that a change in the income tax schedule can explain a significant part of the change in wealth concentration. Aoki and Nirei (2017) provide a
micro-foundation for the heterogeneous returns to wealth and income inequality. In
Aoki and Nirei (2017), a decrease in the tax leads entrepreneurs to invest in risky
projects and, hence, increases the dispersion of income. I consider a different reason for the increase in income dispersion and the heterogeneous return to wealth:
a change in production technology due to an increase in automation. This chapter
focuses on the link between automation and wealth concentration. To understand
the individual effect of automation technology I abstract from the impact of other
possible explanations.
The paper most related to this chapter is Moll, Rachel, and Restrepo (2019),
who study the impact of automation technology on income and wealth inequality.
They, too, use a task-based framework, but in their model, the main mechanism is
the increase in return to capital. Due to the birth and death process, only a small
fraction of households live long enough to accumulate wealth exponentially. The
top of the wealth distribution is populated by long-lived households. As automation
advances, the return to capital increases, and, hence, households save more, which
leads to an increase in the top wealth inequality. In contrast, my mechanism depends
on the higher return to entrepreneurial skill. Given that more than 40% of the
individuals at the top of the wealth distribution are entrepreneurs and more than
two-thirds of the income source is the return to human capital (either through labor
or business) (Kuhn and Rıéos-Rull, 2016), this channel, too, is important. Moreover,
an important fraction of top wealth owners are self-made and acquired their fortune
in a short period of time. For example, half of the individuals on the 2017 Forbes 400
list are self-made billionaires (Guvenen et al., 2019).
The production function in the model builds on the previous chapter. Using
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the same production function, I provide a theory that links automation to the Pareto
parameter of the top income distribution. I show that, in a static model, when
the productivity of entrepreneurial skill is distributed by a Pareto distribution, the
right tail of income distribution can be approximated with a Pareto distribution as
well. The shape parameter of the top income distribution is a function of the shape
parameter of the productivity distribution, the automation level, and the convexity
of labor cost. Moreover, he shows that the thickness of the right tail increases with
the level of automation. In this chapter, I focus on the impact of automation on top
wealth inequality and quantify how the change in income concentration attributable
to automation impacts wealth concentration.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model and discusses the impact of automation on wealth concentration. Section 3 provides details
about calibration. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 analyses welfare consequences and Section 6 concludes.

2.2. The Model
My model is based on the dynamic general equilibrium incomplete market model
of Aiyagari (1994), augmented by entrepreneurial choice and financial frictions, as
in Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) and Quadrini (2000). The main difference between
the current model and the standard models found in the literature is the production
function. There are two main differences in this production function. First, I use a
task-based framework, as in Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018), that provides a notion
of automation choice in the model. Second, I define the span-of-control as a function
of the measure of labor, instead of total output, as in the first chapter. This leads
the severity of the diseconomies scale to be a function of automation.
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2.2.1. Demographics and Preferences
There is a continuum of the infinitely lived individual of measure one. The utility of
individuals from consumption is given by u(c). Individuals discount the future at a
rate of β. Individuals are subject to uninsurable labor productivity shock; however,
there is no aggregate uncertainty. The labor market productivity of an individual
evolves according to a Markov process. Let ps (s0 |s) denote the probability density
function of the next period’s labor productivity s0 , conditional on this period’s labor
productivity s. Let S be the set of all possible levels of labor productivity.
In a given period, an individual can be either a worker or an entrepreneur.
A worker supplies a unit of labor inelastically. In each period, a worker gets an
entrepreneurial idea with probability p. The productivity of the idea z follows a
Pareto distribution with the shape parameter µ and the scale parameter z . Let φ(.)
¯
denote the pdf of the distribution of z and let Z denote the set of all possible values
of z. If the individual implements the idea, he becomes an entrepreneur; otherwise,
he remains a worker. The productivity of the idea remains constant throughout
the entrepreneurship spell. At the beginning of the period, an entrepreneur decides
whether to continue to operate his firm or become a worker. If he becomes a worker,
he loses the idea and needs to find another one to become an entrepreneur again.
With probability pe , his business fails for some exogenous reason and he becomes a
worker.

2.2.2. Technology
There are two production sectors: corporate and non-corporate. Firms in the noncorporate sector are owned by entrepreneurs. However, in reality, not all firms are
closely held by entrepreneurs. Therefore, following Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) and
Quadrini (2000), I also include a corporate sector. There is a unique homogeneous
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good in the economy; hence, both sectors produce the same good. Both sectors have
a similar production function. The main difference is that firms in the non-corporate
sector face a convex cost of labor, which leads to a production function that exhibits
decreasing returns to scale.
Corporate Sector
I use a task-based framework similar to Zeira (1998) and Acemoglu and Restrepo
(2018). To produce a final good, a measure of one of the tasks must be completed.
There is no market for tasks; hence, each firm needs to complete all tasks inside the
firm.
There are two types of tasks: automated and non-automated. If a task is
automated, then capital and labor are perfect substitutes in production. On the other
hand, if a task is not automated, then the only input in the production function is
labor. I assume that the productivity of labor and capital is the same across all tasks.
Let I be automation technology frontier such that any task below I is automated and
any tasks above I are non-automated. Formally, the production function of task
i ∈ [0, 1] is given by:
yi =




ki + `i

if i ≤ I,



`i

if i > I,

(2.1)

Tasks are complements and they are aggregated into output by a unit elastic
aggregator (i.e., Cobb-Douglas):
Z1
ln Y =

ln(yi )di,
0
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(2.2)

where Y is the total output. The problem of a corporate firm is:
Z1
max AY − w

Z1
`i di − (r + δ)

`i ,ki

0

ki di,
0

where A is the aggregate TFP and δ is the depreciation rate.
Observe that automation is a labor-replacing technology. An improvement
in automation, i.e., an increase in I, means that labor can be replaced in this new
automated task. However, a task complements other tasks. Therefore, even though
automation replaces labor within a task, it improves the productivity of other tasks
by cost reduction.
Since capital and labor are perfect substitutes, only one of them is used to
produce a task. Because the productivity of capital and labor is the same across all
tasks, the cheaper input is used in automated tasks. In equilibrium, because there is a
positive supply of capital, it is the case that the price of capital is less than the wage;
hence, the only capital is used in automated tasks, i.e., `(i) = 0 for i ≤ I. Moreover,
by the symmetry of tasks, the optimal choice of capital is the same for all automated
tasks and the optimal choice of labor is the same for all non-automated tasks, i.e.,
k(i) = k for all i ≤ I and `(i) = ` for all i > I. Hence, the optimal solution induces
to a Cobb-Douglas production function for a firm with the capital share equal to I:
Y = k I `1−I .

(2.3)

Non-corporate Sector
Entrepreneurs have access to a decreasing returns to scale production function. The
production of tasks and aggregation into the final good is similar to the corporate
sector. However, there is an additional convex cost that depends on the measure of
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labor used in the production. The profit function of an entrepreneur with productivity
z is given by:


Z1
zAY − w

Z1

`i di − v 
0



Z1

`i di − (r + δ)
0

ki di,
0

where Y is given by (2.2) and v(.) is the convex cost with properties v 0 > 0 and
v 00 > 0.
Convex cost of labor
The main mechanism in this chapter depends on the convex cost of labor.
Observe that Y is constant returns to scale, and, therefore zAY − v(.) is decreasing
returns to scale. Here, the convex cost can be seen in a reduced form as the organization cost of labor or the hiring-firing cost of labor or search cost. For example,
in the first chapter, I show that this convex cost can be micro-founded by Shapiro
and Stiglitz’s (1984) efficiency wage theory of the shirking model. In order to prevent
labor from shirking, the entrepreneur needs to spend additional resources. Because
capital does not have an incentive to shirk, it does not create any moral hazard problem; hence, this additional cost does not depend on capital. The general idea is that
if entrepreneurs want to grow, they need to pay more. In this sense, a theory of a
firm-size-wage premium can generate the desired result.
I assume that this convex cost of labor is only relevant in the non-corporate
sector. In other words, the corporate sector can scale its production perfectly and
can replicate the process that causes this cost in the non-corporate sector, whether it
is vacancy posting in search friction or problem of monitoring workers or something
else. This assumption leads to constant returns to scale production function in the
corporate sector. Therefore, there is a representative firm in the corporate sector and
I do not need to make assumptions about firm distribution, who owns these firms,
and competition structure.
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2.2.3. Financial Market
To raise capital for a business, an entrepreneur can borrow from the financial market.
However, an entrepreneur needs to provide collateral in order to borrow. Hence, the
amount of borrowing depends on the entrepreneur’s assets. An entrepreneur can use
up to λ fraction of his asset in his business; i.e.,
Z1
ki di ≤ λa,

(2.4)

0

where a is the level of asset owned by the entrepreneur and λ > 1. In other words,
an entrepreneur can only rent up to (λ − 1) fraction of his asset.
Workers cannot borrow from the financial market. Only entrepreneurs can
borrow, but they can only use it in their business; they cannot consume it.

2.2.4. Problem of an individual
Let V (a, s) denotes the lifetime value of a worker with labor productivity s and asset
a and let E(a, s, z) be the lifetime value of an entrepreneur with entrepreneurial
productivity z.
Problem of a Worker
Consider a worker with labor productivity s and asset a. He earns ws as labor income
and ra as capital income. With probability p, he gets an idea and decides whether
to become an entrepreneur or not. With the remaining probability, he remains as a
worker. The lifetime value of a worker is
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V (a, s) = max
u(c) + β p
0
c,a

XZ

[max{V (a0 , s0 ), E(a0 , s0 , z 0 )}] phi(z 0 )dz 0 ps (s0 |s)

s0 ∈Sz∈Z


+ (1 − p)
s.t. c + a0 ≤ ws + (1 + r)a, a ≥ 0, c ≥ 0.

X

V (a0 , s0 )ps (s0 |s)

s0 ∈S

(2.5)

Problem of an Entrepreneur
Consider an entrepreneur with entrepreneurial productivity z, labor productivity s
and asset a. He chooses which tasks to automate, how much capital and labor he
needs for each task, and how much to save. First, consider the profit maximization
problem. For a given asset level this problem is static. Because in an automated
task labor and capital are perfect substitutes, only one of the inputs is used. Therefore, if an entrepreneur automates a task, he uses only capital in that task. An
entrepreneur faces two constraints. The first constraint is the automation constraint:
he can only automate only the tasks that are technologically amenable to automation. In other words, the choice of automation I ? must be lower than the exogenously
given automation level I. The second constraint is the financial constraint defined in
equation (2.4).
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Formally, the problem of an entrepreneur is:


Z1
π(z, a) =

max

I ? ,{`i }i∈[I ? ,1] ,
{ks }s∈[0,I ? )

`i di − v 

zY − w



Z1

`i di − (r + δ)

I?

I?

ZI ?
ks ds

(2.6)

0

s.t. 0 ≤ I ? ≤ I,
ZI ?
k(s)ds ≤ λa,
0

`i ≥ 0, ks ≥ 0,

and the production function of tasks (2.1) and the production function of final good
(2.2).
Then, the lifetime value of an entrepreneur is
E(a, s, z) = max
u(c) + β [(1 − pe )E [max{V (a0 , s0 ), E(a0 , s0 , z)}] + pe E[V (a0 , s0 )]]
0
c,a

(2.7)
s.t. c + a0 ≤ π(a, z) + (1 + r)a,
a0 ≥ 0, c ≥ 0.

u(c) is the utility from today’s consumption. With probability pe his business will
fail and he will become a worker for an exogenous reason. With probability 1 − pe his
business will continue, however, he can still close and become a worker if his labor
productivity becomes high enough. His resources today are profit, π(a, z), and return
to the asset.

2.2.5. Definition of Equilibrium
Now I can define a competitive equilibrium:

65

Definition 3. A stationary equilibrium consists of prices w and r; lifetime value
function and policy function for a worker with asset level a and labor productivity
a, V (a, s), gw (a, s); a lifetime value function and policy function for entrepreneur
with asset level a, labor productivity s and entrepreneurial productivity z, E(a, s, z),
ge (a, s, z); and an automation decision, a labor and capital demand of entrepreneur
I ? (a, z), `(a, z, i), k(a, z, i); a labor and capital demand of corporate firms, `c (i), kc (i);
an optimal choice of occupation, go (a, s, z); and a stationary distribution of individuals
over asset level, labor productivity and entrepreneurial productivity Γ(a, s, z), where
z = 0 is for workers, such that:
• Value functions and policy functions solve (2.5) and (2.7),
• I ? (a, z), `(a, z, i), k(a, z, i) solve entrepreneur problem (2.6),
• labor and capital demand of corporate firm are given by:
– `c (i) = `c for i > I, and kc (i) = k for i ≤ I,
– A(kc /`c )I = w,
– A(`c /kc )1−I = r + δ,
• optimal occupational choice: go (a, s, z) = 1 if E(a, s, z) > V (a, s),
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• distribution of individuals is stationary:
0

Z Z

0

Γ(a , s , z) =

(1 − pe )go (a0 , s0 , z)ps (s, s0 )Γ(a, s, z)db+

B

Z Ze

pgo (a0 , s0 , z)phi(z)ps (s, s0 )Γ(a, s, 0)dads,

B

Γ(a0 , s0 , 0) =

Z Zw

[pe ps (s, s0 )Γ(a, s, z) + (1 − pe )(1 − go (a0 , s0 , z)Γ(a, s, z)]dads+

B

Z Ze

(1 − p)ps (s, s0 )Γ(a, s, 0)dads+

Bw
∞
Z Z

Z

z
¯

Bw

pps (s, s0 )phi(z 0 )(1 − go (a0 , s0 , z 0 ))Γ(a, s, 0)dadsdz 0 ,

where Bw = {(a, s)|gw (a, s) = a0 }, and Be = {(a, s, z)|ge (a, s, z) = a0 },
• labor market clears:
Z1

Z

Z
`(a, z, i)dΓ(a, s, z)di + (1 − I)`c =

sdΓ(a, s, 0),

I ? (a,z)

• capital market clears:
Z

I ?Z(a,z)

Z

k(a, z, i)dΓ(a, s, z)di + Ikc =

adΓ(a, s, z).

0

2.2.6. Impact of An Improvement in Automation
The main mechanism in this chapter is the impact of automation on returns to entrepreneurial skills. An improvement in automation technology has two impacts on
the problem of the entrepreneur. First, it relaxes the automation constraint, and,
second, it tightens the collateral constraint. In this section, I discuss how these two
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affect wealth concentration.
To understand the impact of an improvement in automation technology on
wealth concentration, it is important to know why the model generates a thick wealth
tail. The basic setup of Aiyagari (1994) fails to generate a thick tail because the
precautionary saving motivation for rich individuals is not high enough, and this is
so because they have a sufficient amount of assets to self-insure (for discussion see
De Nardi and Fella (2017)). The literature discusses some additional mechanisms to
generate thick wealth distribution (Benhabib and Bisin, 2018). In this model, there
are two main channels: an endogenous high and persistent “superstar” income state,
and a heterogeneous return to capital.
First, in the model, with a small probability, workers can draw a highly productive idea that has a high return and become a “superstar”. However, in each
period they face business failure risk, with probability pe they become a worker. This
creates an income risk for entrepreneurs. They earn multiples of wage income today,
but tomorrow their business can fail and, consequently, suffer a drastic decrease in
income. This provides a precautionary saving motive for entrepreneurs: they want to
save more to smooth consumption. Castañeda, Dı́az-Giménez, and Rı́os-Rull (2003)
show that this type of large income risk for high-income earners can generate realistic
income and wealth distribution.
An improvement in automation leads to a higher return in the superstar stage.
Relaxing the automation constraint enables high productive entrepreneurs to scale
up their production more than low productive entrepreneurs. This leads income
distribution to spread out and increase the income concentration, which eventually
leads to higher wealth concentration.

Proposition 5. Fix prices w and r. Let π̃(z; I) be the profit function when au68

tomation technology is given by I and without the collateral constraint, i.e., when
entrepreneurs operate their businesses at the efficient level. Then, π̃ 0 (z; I 0 ) > π̃ 0 (z; I)
for I 0 > I, where π̃ 0 is the derivative with respect to z.
The proposition states that an improvement in automation increases the profit
of a highly productive entrepreneur more than a poorly productive entrepreneur.
The intuition for this result is provided in the first chapter. An advancement in
automation relaxes the technology constraint in (2.6). Since this constraint is more
costly for highly productive entrepreneurs, the return is higher for them, relative to
low productive entrepreneurs. This is why the gap between high and low productive
entrepreneurs is increasing, and it implies that the top entrepreneur’s income increases
substantially relative to low-skilled entrepreneurs and workers. Moreover, the risk of
business failure increases. Hence, the savings of highly productive entrepreneurs are
higher, which leads to an increase in wealth concentration.
To see the impact clearly, assume that the convex cost of labor takes the form
v(L) = cLα and consider an entrepreneur with high enough assets that the collateral
constraint does not bind. Then, we have a closed-form solution and the profit is then

1

π(a, z) = c(α − 1)L?α = c− α−1 (α − 1)

"

z
(r + δ)I

1
 1−I

α
# α−1
α
  α−1
1
−w
.
α

(2.8)

Observe that the profit function is convex in z and the convexity is increasing
in I. In a sense, the superstar effect, wherein a small change in the entrepreneurial
ability increases the return substantially (Rosen, 1981), becomes more pronounced.
Therefore, income distribution spreads out. In other words, this channel increases
income concentration, which eventually affects wealth concentration. In the first
chapter, I show that when z is distributed by a Pareto with shape parameter µ, the
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Figure 2.2: Impact of Automation on Profit and Return to Capital
π

πa (a, z)
I = 0.36

I = 0.36

I 0 = 0.41

I 0 = 0.41

π̃ 0 (z; I 0 )

π̃ 0 (z; I)

log(a)

z
(a) Profit function π̃(z)

(b) Marginal return to business capital.

right tail of the income distribution can be approximated by a Pareto distribution with
shape parameter µ(1 − I)(α − 1)/α. However, this result does not apply here because
of the collateral constraint, which causes entry into entrepreneurship to depend on the
asset level of individuals. Hence, the equilibrium distribution of active entrepreneurs’
productivity is not the same as the distribution of z. However, the idea is similar,
and the thickness of income distribution depends on the productivity distribution,
automation level, and convexity of the labor cost function.
The second channel that affects the tail of the wealth distribution is the heterogeneous return to capital, which is an important channel that generates thick
wealth tails (Hubmer, Krusell, and Smith Jr, 2020; Benhabib, Bisin, and M. Luo,
2019). Due to the collateral constraint, return to capital is not equalized across entrepreneurs. Since entrepreneurs cannot achieve an efficient level of production, the
marginal productivity of capital is higher than the risk-free interest rate. Therefore,
for entrepreneurs, the return to capital is higher than it is for a worker. This generates higher capital income for entrepreneurs. Furthermore, because the tightness of
the collateral constraint increases with productivity, there is also a dispersion in the
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return to capital across entrepreneurs. A higher return to capital creates a higher
incentive to save.
An improvement in automation technology increases the return to business
capital for entrepreneurs whose collateral constraint binds because it increases the
marginal product of capital. For an entrepreneur, a higher asset level has two benefits.
First, it increases capital income through the risk-free rate. Second, it relaxes the
collateral constraint, and hence, it increases the profit. Clausen and Strub (2012)
prove that the envelope theorem holds in dynamic models with the occupational
choice. Hence, the marginal return to higher capital today can be calculated by the
envelope theorem and the first-order condition with respect to consumption, which is
given by:
Ea (a, s, z) = [πa (a, z) + (1 + r)]u0 (c),
where subscript denotes the derivative with respect to the denoted argument. The
first term on the right-hand side is the shadow cost of the collateral constraint in
the entrepreneur’s problem (2.6), and it is positive for binding entrepreneurs. Now I
show that πa (a, z) rises with automation technology.
Proposition 6. Fix prices w and r. Let π(a, z; I) denote the profit function when
automation technology is I. Then, the derivative of profit function with respect to a
is increasing with I, i.e., πa (a, z; I 0 ) ≥ πa (a, z; I) when I 0 > I. When the automation
constraint binds, this condition holds with strict inequality.
This implies that the return to savings increases for entrepreneurs whose collateral constrain binds. This is intuitive because when the automation constraint
binds, an increase in I leads to a higher marginal product of capital. However, because of the collateral constraint, the entrepreneur cannot rent more capital. Hence,
the entrepreneur’s incentive to save increases. Formally, the shadow cost of the col71

lateral constraint increases with an increase of I. As the savings of entrepreneurs
increase, the wealth concentration increases.
However, notice that in Figure 2.2b, both ends of the graph are constant, and
an increase in I does not affect those regions. It is easy to see the reason for the
high a. When wealth is large, the collateral constraint does not bind, and, hence, this
channel disappears for wealthy entrepreneurs. In the case of a low a, the automation
constraint does not bind. An entrepreneur with a low level of assets does not use
all of the available automation technology because he does not have enough capital
to allocate across a wide range of tasks. Instead, he uses labor. When his asset
increases, he starts automating new tasks, and the overall effect on the marginal
product of capital remains constant. Because the automation constraint does not
bind for entrepreneurs who have a low level of assets, these entrepreneurs are not
impacted by an improvement in I. Therefore, the magnitude of this channel depends
on the size of these regions. If the distribution of z is concentrated on a low level of
productivity, then an efficient level can be achieved very easily, and, hence, a rise in
I might not have a big impact on savings.
Here, I consider partial equilibrium results by fixing prices. However, in general, equilibrium prices will adjust, and, hence, the overall impact might be different. Nevertheless, in (2.8), the convexity of the profit function does not depend on
the prices. Hence, price only affects the level; in relative terms, high productive entrepreneurs still are better off with advanced automation technology even when prices
adjust.

2.3. Quantitative Analysis
I calibrate the model to the US economy in 1968. I choose 1968 because this is the
first year for which I can calculate the entrepreneurship rate in PSID.2 Moreover,
2

Business ownership question started to ask in 1969, even though PSID starts in 1968.
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top wealth share and labor share were stable in the 1960s, and they only started to
change in the 1970s. In this regard, I believe 1968 is a good starting point. A period
in the model is a year.
The aim of this chapter to analyze the impact of an improvement in automation
technology on top wealth inequality. After calibrating the model to 1968, I change
the automation level I to the 2016 value, leaving all other parameters at the same as
the calibrated values. Then, I calculate the change in the top wealth shares between
the two steady states.
The main parameter in this analysis is the automation level, I. Recall that the
optimal solution of the corporate sector induces to Cobb-Douglas looking production
function, equation (2.3), with capital share I. So, I set the automation level to the
capital share of income. It is important to notice that I only use the capital share
in the corporate sector. First, this allows me to exogenously pin down I because
the capital share in the non-corporate sector is endogenous. Hence, I cannot set it
exogenously for 2016. Second, the Penn World Table splits self-employed income
using the share of the non-self-employed sector’s capital share. The capital share of
income was 0.36 in 1968, and it was 0.41 in 2016, which is the latest year for which I
have wealth inequality data.

2.3.1. Parametrization
This section describes the quantitative specification of the model.
Preferences: I consider the CRRA utility function, c1−σ /(1 − σ) and the risk
aversion parameter, σ, is set to 1.5. I calibrate the discount factor β to match the
capital-to-GDP ratio of 3, K/Y = 3.
Technology: I normalized the total factor productivity A to 1. As I noted
above, automation technology is set to the capital share of income. The depreciation
rate, δ, is set to 5%.
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I assume that the convex cost of labor is given by v(L) = cLα . Since this cost
function is novel, there is no standard way to calibrate these parameters. Coefficient
c determines the level of the cost function, and, therefore, the level of profit. This is
clear from equation (2.8). Because in this model the top of the income distribution
is populated by entrepreneurs, it will directly affect the share of the top 1%. Thus, I
calibrate c to match the wealth share of the top 1%.
The convexity of the cost function, α, affects the size of entrepreneurs’ businesses. However, due to a lack of public data on private firms that goes back to the
1960s, I consider size not in terms of employment but of capital. The underlying assumption here is that employment is positively correlated with capital size. I match
the ratio of non-financial non-corporate business assets to non-financial business assets, which I calculate using the FED’s Flow of Funds.3
Labor Productivity Process: I assume that the log of labor productivity,
log(s), evolves with an AR(1) process:
log(s0 ) = ρlog(s) + ,  ∼ N (0, σs2 ).
I set the autocorrelation ρ = 0.9 and the standard deviation of innovation to
0.2 following Guvenen et al. (2019). I use the Tauchen and Hussey (1991) method to
discretize the labor productivity process.
Distribution of Ideas: There are 4 parameters for the process of ideas: the
probability of getting an idea, p; the probability of exogenous exit, pe ; and the scale
and the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution of z, z and µ. I set the exogenous
¯
exit probability to 26.5%, which is the share of entrepreneurs in PSID that leave
entrepreneurship status next year.
3

FRED series TABSNNB and TABSNNCB.
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The probability of getting an idea and the scale parameter cannot be identified
jointly. To see this consider the problem of a worker (2.5). Because W (a, s, z) is
increasing in z, let z ? (a, s) be the marginal productivity of the entrepreneur who is
indifferent between becoming an entrepreneur and a worker. Let z 0 be the minimum
of such z ? . Assume z 0 > z . Since z ? ≥ z 0 , I can write the problem as
¯
V (a, s) = max
u(ws + (1 + r)a − a0 )
a0


Z∞
+ β (1 − p)V (a, y) + pPz (z 0 )V (a, s) + max{V (a, s), W (a, s, z)}pz (z)dz  .
z0

Now consider p0 = p(1 − Pz (z 0 )). Observe that:
µz 0µ
µz µ z 0µ
¯ · µ = µ+1 .
pz (z|z > z ) = g(z)/(1 − Pz (z )) = µ+1
z
z
z
¯
0

0

This implies that z|z > z 0 ∼ P areto(µ, z 0 ), so set z 0 = z 0 . Then, the problem
¯
of a worker with new parameters is:

0
V (a, s) = max
u(ws + (1 + r)a − a ) + β (1 − p(1 − Pz (z 0 )))V (a, s)
a0

Z ∞
max{V (a, s), W (a, s, z)}pz (z)/(1 − Pz (z))dz .
+ p(1 − Pz (z))
z0

This is the same problem as before. Hence, there is no change in the solution.
Thus, for any z < z 0 , I can find (p̃, z̃) such that the solution is the same with (p, z ).
¯
Therefore, I set z = A = 1. Observe that because there is no profit in the corporate
¯
sector, no one wants to become an entrepreneur when productivity is equal to A.
Hence A < z 0 , so it satisfies the condition.
This leaves me with two parameters to calibrate. I calibrate the probability of
getting an idea to match the entrepreneurship rate because it determines the entry
into entrepreneurship. Hence, it is directly related to the share of entrepreneurs. I
calculate this moment using the PSID. I define entrepreneurs as self-employed workers
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Table 2.1: Exogenously Calibrated
I

capital share

0.36

Penn World Table

δ

depreciation rate

0.05

ρy

labor productivity persistency

0.9

Guvenen et al. (2019)

σy

labor productivity variance

0.2

Guvenen et al. (2019)

σu

risk aversion

1.5

-

pe

entrepreneur exit

0.265

PSID

z
¯
A

scale parameter for idea

1

TFP

1

who own a business. The shape parameter determines the thickness of entrepreneurial
productivity. It directly impacts the tail of the income distribution, which affects
the tail of the wealth distribution. Therefore, I match the thickness of the wealth
distribution. To this end, I calibrate the shape of the Pareto distribution to match
the ratio of the top 0.1% share to the top 1% share.4 Because I set the coefficient
of convex cost of labor, c to match the share of the top 1%, instead of the relative
share, I match directly the wealth share of the top 0.1%. The main idea is that c
determines the level and µ determines the thickness of the top distribution.
Collateral Constraint: The last parameter of the model is the collateral
constraint of entrepreneurs, λ. Clearly, this parameter affects how much entrepreneurs
can borrow, given their asset level. Therefore, I calibrate this parameter to match
the debt-to-asset ratio of the non-corporate business sector, which is obtained from
the Flow of Funds.5 .
Table 2.1 summarizes the parametrization.
4

It is known, first, that top wealth distribution can be approximated by a Pareto distribution
and, second, that the relative shares at the top are a function of the shape parameter. In other
words, matching the relative share is similar to matching the Pareto tail.
5
FRED series TLBSNNB over TABSNNB
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Table 2.2: Calibration Result
Parameter

Value

Target

Data

Model

3

3

Discount Factor

β

0.92

K/Y

Col. Cons

λ

1.2

Debt-to-Asset

0.19

0.19

Convexity of Cost α

1.8

Share of NC in Capital (%)

35.6

35.28

Prob. of Idea

p

0.94

Ent Rate (%)

7.97

7.97

Coef. of cost

c

0.26

Top 1 Share (%)

27.19

27.23

Pareto shape

µ

7.87

Top 0.1 Share (%)

9.23

9.23

2.3.2. Model Fit
To sum up, I choose the probability of getting an idea, p, the discount factor β,
the collateral constraint λ, the coefficient of convex labor cost c, the convexity of
convex labor cost α, and the shape parameter of Pareto distribution µ to match the
entrepreneurial rate, the capital-to-income ratio, the debt-to-asset ratio, the ratio of
non-financial non-corporate business assets to the total non-financial business asset,
the wealth share of top 1% and the wealth share of top 0.1%. As can be seen from
table 2.2, the model matches the targeted moments well.
The model also fits the overall distribution of wealth remarkably well. Figure
2.3a shows the Lorenz curve for the wealth distribution above the 50th percentile both
from the data and the model. The horizontal axis is the percentiles of the wealth
distribution and the vertical axis is the cumulative shares of wealth. The inner plot
zooms into the top 1 percentile. The model fits the data very well: the two curves
are almost on top of one another. Table 2.3 shows numerical values for some of the
points in this graph to give a sense of the difference. Recall that I am only matching
two points on the top percentile, but the model also matches the lower percentiles.
As a measure for overall inequality, the Gini coefficient in the model is 0.82, whereas
the same figure is 0.83 in the data.
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Table 2.3: Non-targeted Moments

Income Gini

Data

Model

0.46

0.36

Income Bottom 50% 20.4%

27.3%

Income Top 10%

36.3%

32.4%

Income Top 1%

13.4%

12.2%

Income Top 0.1%

5.1%

4.2%

Income Top 0.01%

2%

1.3%

Wealth Gini

0.83

0.82

Wealth Bottom 50%

1.2%

1.7%

Wealth Top 10%

69.5%

69.8%

3%

2.6%

Wealth Top 0.01%

Even though the income distribution is not targeted, the model provides a
good fit for top income inequality. Figure 2.3b plots the Lorenz curve for income
distribution. The blue line lies above the orange line, which means that for any
percentile, the cumulative share below that percentile is higher in the model than in
the data. In other words, the model generates lower income inequality than the data.
The Gini coefficient for income is 0.36 in the model and 0.46 in the data. However,
the gap between these two lines is decreasing at the top of the distribution. Therefore,
the model matches the top percentiles better than the low percentiles. This is also
clear in the upper panel of table 2.3, which shows top shares for selected percentiles.

2.3.3. Testing Model Predictions
In this section, I use the data to test the model’s prediction.
One of the main assertions of this chapter is that automation enables entrepreneurs to scale up their production. An implication of this is that the average
firm size increases with the automation level. Equation (2.8) shows that profit is
a power function of employment. Hence, as the convexity of the profit function
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Figure 2.3: Lorenz Curve
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increases, the convexity of the optimal labor choice as a function of productivity increases. This implies that the employment share of highly productive entrepreneurs is
increasing, and, thus, the average firm size in the entrepreneurial sector is increasing.
To test the hypothesis that higher automation leads to larger firms, I regress
the change in firm size to a change in automation. Because this result is for the
entrepreneurial sector, I only consider the employment distribution across private
firms. I obtain the data from the Amadeus database, which provides information
about private firms in Europe. For each industry-country pair, I calculate three
measures: average firm size, average capital-to-labor ratio, and the share of top 1%
of firms in employment. For the automation measure, I use information technology
intensity, defined by total IT capital over total capital. I construct this measure using
the data from EU KLEMS. I consider the changes between 2006 and 2016 because
the number of observations in the Amadeus database is significantly low for previous
years.
Table 2.4 presents the results. All of the measures of change in firm size
distribution are positively correlated with IT intensity. This implies that industries
that observed a higher rate of IT growth also observed a higher rate of firm size
growth. A percentage increase in the growth of IT intensity leads to around a 0.6
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Table 2.4: Automation and Firm Size
Dependent variable:

∆log(IT Intensity)

Nobs

∆log(Ave. FS)

∆log(Ave. K/L)

∆log(Top Emp Share)

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.581∗∗∗
(0.147)

0.633∗∗∗
(0.183)

0.276∗
(0.151)

182

174

182
∗

Note:

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

percent increase in the growth of the average firm size in employment and the growth
of the average capital intensity of a firm. Also, the growth rate of the employment
share of the top 1% of firms increases by 0.3%. Furthermore, Bessen (2017) and
Brynjolfsson et al. (2008) show that in terms of sales, higher IT intensity leads to
higher market concentration. Stiebale, Suedekum, and Woessner (2020) estimate
that the impact of robots on productivity and sales is greater in larger firms than
in smaller firms. Hence, the data supports the model’s prediction that automation
enables entrepreneurs to grow their businesses.
Another prediction of the model is that labor productivity is increasing with
employment size while capital productivity is decreasing with capital size. This is
true because of the convex cost of labor. Given that large businesses have a higher
marginal cost of labor, they also must have higher labor productivity. The opposite is
true for capital because capital has no convex cost. To see this, consider the first-order
condition of the entrepreneurs’ problem:
zY
w + v 0 (L) zY
r + δ + λη(z, a)
=
,
=
,
L
1−I
K
I
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Table 2.5: Firm Size and Factor Productivity
log(Productivity)

log(Employment)

Data

Model

0.0725∗∗∗

3.38

(0.005)
log(Assets)

−0.26∗∗∗

-1.52

(0.005)
where η(z, a) is the Lagrange multiplier of the collateral constraint. Given the convexity of v, labor productivity must be increasing with employment. Because the
Lagrange multiplier is increasing at z and decreasing with a, it is not immediately
clear how the capital productivity behaves. However, in quantitative results the relationship is negative, meaning that capital productivity is decreasing with capital
size. In a world without friction and convex cost, these productivity measures would
be solely a function of prices. In contrast, this model predicts that there is a positive correlation between employment size and labor productivity, whereas there is a
negative correlation between capital size and capital productivity.
To test this prediction, I use firm-level data from the Amadeus database and
use sales over input as a measure of factor productivity. For capital, I consider total
assets. Table 2.5 presents the results from the regression and model outcome.
Unfortunately, the Amadeus database does not have data for 1968. Therefore
I calculate the model correlation at the second steady state. However, all of the parameters are calibrated to 1968. Consequently, numerical results cannot be compared
directly. The objective here is to demonstrate that the coefficients are different signs
both in the data and in the model outcome.
To be clear, in the regressions in this section, I do not claim any causality.
These regressions are motivated by the implication of the model, which is to show
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that model predictions are consistent with the data.

2.4. Quantitative Impact of an Increase in Automation
The aim of this chapter is to understand the impact of automation on wealth concentration. To this end, I increase the automation parameter, I, to the 2016 value,
leaving all other parameters constant. In 2016, the capital share of income was 41%,
and so I increased I from 0.36 to 0.41.

2.4.1. Impact on the Wealth Distribution
Table 2.6 presents the equilibrium wealth distribution in the new steady state. The
first and second columns show the values from the World Inequality Database for
1968 and 2016, respectively. The third column shows the percentage change between
these years. The last column shows how much these changes are generated by the
model, which is calculated by dividing the percentage change in the model by the
percentage change in the data. In the data, the wealth share owned by the top 1%
increased about one third. In the model, it increased by about 8%, which implies that
the model can generate one-fourth of the observed increase in the top 1%’s wealth
share. On the other hand, the wealth share of the very top is more pronounced in
the data. The wealth share owned by the top 0.1% doubled between 1968 and 2016.
However, the rise of the top 0.1% share in the model is not as pronounced as in the
data. The model generates a 10% increase in the wealth share of the top 0.1%. As
noted above, this is so because the heterogeneous return is not relevant for very rich
individuals because the collateral constraint does not bind. Hence, automation does
not increase the return to business capital, hence it does not generate an additional
incentive to save more. All of the dynamics at the very top occur through an increase
in income concentration. The impact of the heterogeneous return channel is more
important for entrepreneurs for whom the collateral constraint is tight. Since this
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Table 2.6: Results - Wealth Distribution
Data 1968

Data 2016

%∆ Data

Model Explains

Bottom 50

1.2%

0.4%

−70%

64%

Top 10

70%

71%

3%

393%

Top 1

27%

37%

35%

27%

Top 0.1

9%

19%

102%

10%

Top 0.01

3%

9%

216%

8%

Gini

0.83

0.84

1%

423%

tightness is decreasing with wealth, this channel becomes more pronounced for lower
parts of the distribution. This is clear from the change in the wealth share of the
top 10%. In the data, it increases by 3%, whereas the model generates about 11%
increase, which is almost 4 times higher than the data.

2.4.2. Impact on the Income Distribution
Table 2.7 shows the change in the income distribution. The model can explain onethird of the increase in the income share of the top 1% and the top 0.1%. This result
is expected because, in theory, the Pareto parameter is proportional to the labor
share of income when there is no collateral constraint, as I prove in the first chapter.
Because the decrease in the labor share of income is a third of the decrease in the
Pareto parameter of the top income distribution, it is expected that the model will
also generate one-third of the observed changes in income concentration. However,
this change partially affects wealth concentration. This is another reason why the
model cannot generate the observed increase in the wealth share of the top 0.1%.
The model can only generate a quarter of the rise in the income concentration, and
a part of it translates into wealth concentration.
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Table 2.7: Results - Income Distribution
Data 1968

Data 2016

%∆ Data

Model Generates

Bottom 50

20.4%

12.5 %

−38.6%

18.57%

Top 10

36.3%

46.7%

29%

49%

Top 1

13.4%

19.6%

46%

39%

Top 0.1

5.1%

8.8%

73%

25%

Top 0.01

2%

3.9%

93%

28%

Gini

0.46

0.60

30%

39%

2.4.3. Discussion of Results
To understand the relevance of this magnitude, I compare this result with Kaymak
and Poschke (2016), who analyze the impact of change in the earnings distribution
and the change in fiscal policy. They find that between 1980 and 2010, the change in
the earnings distribution alone can explain 60% of the increase in the wealth share
of the top 1%. In contrast, the current model can explain 25%. However, it is
important to note that Kaymak and Poschke (2016) feed the change in the earnings
distribution as seen in the date into their model. In contrast, in the current model,
the change in income concentration is endogenous. Because income concentration
leads to wealth concentration, the success of the model depends on the change in
income concentration. To understand the link between top income inequality and
top wealth inequality, consider the ratio of the change in the top wealth share to the
change in the top income share. In the data, this ratio is 0.76 while in the model
it is 0.53. In other words, given the change in income concentration, the model can
explain two-thirds of the increase in top wealth inequality.

2.4.4. Alternative Measure of Automation
I use the change in the labor share of income to measure the increase in automation
technology. However, not all of the decrease in the labor share can be accounted for
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Table 2.8: Results - Wealth Distribution - IT Share
Data 1968

Data 2016

%∆ Data

Model Explains

Bottom 50

1.2%

0.4%

−70%

41%

Top 10

70%

71%

3%

203%

Top 1

27%

37%

35%

17%

Top 0.1

9%

19%

102%

5%

Top 0.01

3%

9%

216%

5%

Gini

0.83

0.84

1%

242%

by the rise in automation. Several other reasons can be at play, such as an increase
in market power, market concentration, or rents in the housing sector (De Loecker,
Eeckhout, and Unger, 2020; Autor, Dorn, et al., 2020; Rognlie, 2016). In this section,
to abstract from other explanations, I consider the change in the share of income that
accrues to IT capital as a measure of the increase in automation technology. This is
not a perfect measure of automation because it does not take into account robots or
machines. However, it is a subset of automation technology, and, consequently, I see
this as a lower bound on improvements in automation technology. Eden and Gaggl
(2018), who estimate the rise in IT share, find that it increased by 3 percentage points.
In contrast, in the main estimation, I consider a 5 percentage points increase. In this
section, I analyzed the impact of an increase in IT share in income by increasing I to
0.39.
One thing to notice is that, because the definition of capital in the model
includes automation and other types of assets, my initial calibration is not affected.
Only the change in the capital share must be related to automation technology. Therefore, I do not re-calibrate the model.
Table 2.8 and Table 2.9 show the changes in wealth and income concentration.
Comparing these to the benchmark results, it can be seen that the impact of automation decreased by 50% to 60%. This is expected since the change in the automation
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Table 2.9: Results - Income Distribution - IT Share
Data 1968

Data 2016

%∆ Data

Model Generates

Bottom 50

20.4%

12.5 %

−38.6%

10.5%

Top 10

36.3%

46.7%

29%

28%

Top 1

13.4%

19.6%

46%

22%

Top 0.1

5.1%

8.8%

73%

14%

Top 0.01

2%

3.9%

93%

17%

Gini

0.46

0.60

30%

24%

level decreased by 60%. Now, the model explains 17% of the rise in the wealth share
of the top 1%.
On the other hand, the model transfers at a higher rate the change in income
concentration into wealth concentration. The ratio of the change in the wealth share
of the top 1% to the change in the income share of the top 1% increased from 0.53
to 0.6. This corresponds to 80% of the same ratio in the data.

2.4.5. Alternative Estimates of Wealth Shares
Several methods can be used to estimate the top wealth shares (Kopczuk, 2015).
The data I use relies on the capitalization method (Saez and Zucman, 2016), which
examines capital tax return data. By observing the realized tax payment, the level
of wealth can be backed out. However, that level depends on assumptions about
the return to wealth. Fagereng et al. (2020) and Bach, Calvet, and Sodini (2020)
show that the return to wealth is not constant across wealth groups and that in
Norway and Sweden there is significant variation in return to wealth. Since there is
a positive correlation between wealth and return to wealth, a simple capitalization
method overestimates the top wealth shares. Smith, Zidar, and Zwick (2020) adjust
the capitalization method to incorporate return heterogeneity and their findings differ
from Saez and Zucman (2016) significantly starting mid-70s. Even though they find
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that the share of the top 1% increased, it is not as pronounced as in the estimate
of Saez and Zucman (2016): it only increased to 30%. Kuhn, Schularick, and Steins
(2020) estimate the wealth shares using the Survey of Consumer Finance and their
estimate is similar to the capitalization method estimation under the assumption of
constant return to wealth. Therefore, in this chapter, I base my analysis on the
estimate of Saez and Zucman (2016).
Both Saez and Zucman (2016) and Smith, Zidar, and Zwick (2020) finds similar top shares until mid-1970s. Thus, current calibration is a good fit for Smith,
Zidar, and Zwick’s (2020) estimate. If I consider the estimate under the assumption
of heterogeneous return, the model generates almost all of the increase in wealth concentration. Therefore, I believe that the result I present in Table 2.6 is a lower bound
for the real impact of automation on top wealth concentration.

2.5. Welfare Analysis
In the previous section, I considered the increase in wealth concentration. However,
automation impacts prices, as does the overall productivity of the economy also. To
understand the overall impact of automation, I analyze in this section the welfare
gains for individuals who have different levels of asset holding and occupation. The
measure that I use for welfare gain is expressed in consumption equivalent terms.
Specifically, for each asset level and skill level, I calculate the required percentage
increase in consumption level during each period and in each states that make individuals indifferent between a world in which automation improved and a world in
which there is no improvement in automation. Formally, welfare gain in consumption
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equivalent terms, denoted by ν, is
"
E

E

∞
X

" t=0
∞
X

#
β t u((1 + ν(a, s, 0))ct (a0 , s0 ))|a, s = V0 (a, s),
#
β t u((1 + ν(a, s, z))ct (a0 , s0 , z))|a, s, z = E0 (a, s, z),

t=0

where Vt (a, s) and Et (a, s, z) is the life-time value of a worker in state (a, s)
and an entrepreneur in state (a, s, z), after t periods during which automation started
to improve. Observe that I do not compare two steady states. Instead, I compare
life-time value in the first steady-state and life-time value in the same period when
automation technology changes, taking into account the transition path of prices and
value functions. Under the assumption that the utility function is CRRA, ν simplifies
to:

ν(a, s, 0) =

ν(a, s, z) =

V0 (a, s)
Vna (a, s)

1/(1−σ)

E0 (a, s, z)
Ena (a, s, z)

− 1,
1/(1−σ)
− 1,

where Vna is the value function at the initial steady state.
To compute the value functions along the transition path, I assume that automation technology improved gradually over 45 years. In other words, I let I increase
from 0.36 to 0.41 at a constant rate for 45 years, and then I fix it at 0.41 thereafter.
Furthermore, I assume that individuals have perfect foresight for the increase in I
and its impact on prices.
For a partition of asset distribution and skill distribution, T ∈ A×S ×{Z ∪0},
I calculate the average welfare gain ν̄ as the weighted average of welfare gains of
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Figure 2.4: Welfare Gains by Occupation and Asset Level

Note: Welfare gain computed in consumption equivalent terms, ν̄ in equation (2.9). The horizontal
axis is the partition on asset, where P x − P y denotes the asset level between the xth and yth
percentile in overall distribution in the initial steady state (not conditional on occupation).

individuals in that partition:
Z
Γ(t)ν(t)dt/Γ(T ).

ν̄ =

(2.9)

T

Figure 2.4 shows the welfare gain by occupation and asset level. The horizontal axis is the partition on the asset; where P x − P y denotes the asset level
between xth and yth percentile in the overall distribution in the initial steady-state
(not conditional on occupation). The figure shows that everyone gained from automation.6 An average worker gained around 5%, whereas an average entrepreneur
gained 8%. Clearly, the gain increases by asset level, and so the wealthiest households
gain the most from automation. It is intuitive that entrepreneurs are gaining more
than workers, given that automation increases the return to entrepreneurial skills.
Even the poorest workers gain, thanks to the shift of employment to more productive
entrepreneurs. Because the top-skilled entrepreneurs can scale up their production,
the share of employment in top firms increases. Hence, there is a significant increase
in productivity in the economy, which leads to welfare gain for workers, too.
Some of the differences between an average worker and an average entrepreneur
can be attributed to the fact that entrepreneurs on average own more assets than
workers. For each partition of the asset level, entrepreneurs gain more than workers.
This is expected: automation directly affects the return on the entrepreneurial skill,
whereas its impact on workers is secondary. However, the gap between entrepreneurs
6

There is no entrepreneur who is in the lowest quartile; hence, the gain is zero there.
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and workers decreases with wealth. At the very top of wealth distribution, the gap
is very small. This is so mainly because, for individuals at the very top, business
income relative to capital income is small. Therefore, whether one is an entrepreneur
or a worker is not very important.
The main underlying assumption in this welfare analysis is that, for two reasons, there is no friction in the labor market for workers to change their jobs. First,
there is no search friction that prevents labor reallocation across firms. Hence, workers can immediately reallocate to highly productive firms. Second, the model does
not allow for different job types or occupations for workers, such as occupations. In
reality, automation does not affect every occupation in the same way. If there were
different types of jobs, and if it was not possible for workers to change their types
of jobs, then automation would not impact everyone in the same way. For example, workers in occupations that are more prone to automation would gain less, or
they could even lose. However, without any friction for labor reallocation, everyone
in the economy enjoys significant gains from automation, although the benefits are
concentrated among wealthy entrepreneurs.

2.6. Conclusion
In the last 50 years, the US has experienced a significant increase in wealth concentration. In this chapter, I analyze the impact of automation technology on the change
in wealth concentration. Automation has two main effects on wealth accumulation.
First, it increases the income concentration because it enables entrepreneurs to scale
up their production. Second, it increases the heterogeneity of return to capital.
I calibrate the model to the US economy in 1968 and then the automation
technology parameter to the 2016 value, keeping everything else constant. The quantitative exercise implies that the improvements in automation technology can explain
one-fourth of the rise in the wealth share of the top 1%. Taking into account the
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transition path, the welfare of workers in consumption equivalence terms increased
by 5%, while the welfare of entrepreneurs increased by 8%. Although everyone gained
thanks to the shift of the labor force to more productive firms, wealthy individuals
gained more than the poor.
One drawback of the quantitative exercise is the lack of a direct measure of
the convex cost of labor. Labor could have a convex cost for many reasons. But the
underlying idea is that if a firm wants to get bigger, it needs to spend more resources.
In a sense, the firm size wage premium can generate this convex cost. This premium
is known to be decreasing – i.e., the wage gap between large firms and small firms
is decreasing (Bloom et al., 2018; Cobb and Lin, 2017). This might be seen as a
decrease in the convexity of labor cost, which eventually leads to a higher return to
capital and entrepreneurial skill. Incorporating the change in firm size wage premium
might provide a good means of analyzing the impact of change in the convex cost of
labor.
In the current model, the top income distribution is populated by entrepreneurs.
However, in the data, for half of the individuals in the top 1% wage is the major source
of income (Smith, Yagan, et al., 2019). Automation might enable the wage of those
people also, for example, it might increase the compensation of CEOs, which might
contribute to wealth inequality. For this, a more rich structure for labor productivity
is needed to be incorporated to also include wage earners at the top of income and
wealth distribution.
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2.A. Proofs
Proposition 5. Fix prices w and r. Let π̃(z; I) be the profit function when automation technology is given by I and without the collateral constraint, i.e., when
entrepreneurs operate their businesses at the efficient level. Then, π̃ 0 (z; I 0 ) > π̃ 0 (z; I)
for I 0 > I, where π̃ 0 is the derivative with respect to z.
Proof. Consider the problem of an entrepreneur in (2.6) without collateral constraint
(assume a is high enough. By envelope theorem, the impact of an increase in automation technology on profit is the shadow cost of automation technology constraint. Let
η be the Lagrange multiplier with that constraint, then:

π̃I (z; I) = η(z).
The first-order condition with respect to I ? is:
zY (ln(k(I)) − ln(`(I))) + w`(I) + v 0 (L)`(I) − (r + δ)k(I) = η(z).

Since in optimal solution marginal rate of technical substitution is equal to relative
marginal costs, this condition simplifies to:

zY (ln(k(I)) − ln(`(I))) = η(z).

The right-hand side is the shadow cost of automation. The left-hand side is the
change in production when automation increases. Observe that the left-hand side is
increasing with z. This is because both zY and k/` are increasing with z. In the
optimal solution, k/` = (w + v 0 (L))/(r + δ). Since L is increasing with z, k/` is
also increasing. Hence, the shadow cost of automation is increasing with z. This
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implies that π̃I (z; I) is increasing with z. By Young’s theorem, the second derivative
is symmetric, hence π̃z (z; I) is increasing with I.

Proposition 6. Fix prices w and r. Let π(a, z; I) denote the profit function when
automation technology is I. Then, the derivative of profit function with respect to a
is increasing with I, i.e., πa (a, z; I 0 ) ≥ πa (a, z; I) when I 0 > I. When the automation
constraint binds, this condition holds with strict inequality.
Proof. Consider the problem of an entrepreneur in (2.6). By envelope theorem, the
impact of an increase in a is:

πa (a, z) = λγ(I),

where γ(I) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the collateral constraint when
automation technology is I. It is clear that when collateral constraint does not bind,
γ(I) = 0. So we want to show that γ(I) is increasing with I when collateral constraint
binds. The first-order condition with respect to k(i) is
zY
= r + δ + λγ(I),
ki
Optimal solution yields to Y = k I `1−I , hence Y /k = (`/k)1−I . Suppose than
Y /k is decreasing with I, then (1 − I)log(`/k) is decreasing in I. Derivative with
respect to I:
−log(`/k) + (1 − I)

d(`/k)
< 0.
dI

Assume that automation constraint binds. Then ` < k, which implies that log(`/k) <
0. Hence, `/k is decreasing with I. We know that k is decreasing because we are
allocating the same level of capital to a larger range of tasks. This implies that `
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must be decreasing, hence total labor L = (1 − I)` is decreasing. Now consider the
first-order condition with respect to `
zY
=z
`

 I
k
= w + v 0 (L).
`

The right-hand side is decreasing because L is decreasing. However, the lefthand side is increasing because (k/`)I is increasing. This leads to a contradiction.
This implies that marginal productivity of capital must be increasing with I, therefore
the shadow cost of collateral constraint is increasing when automation technology and
collateral constraint are binding.
Now assume that automation constraint does not bind. Then ` = k, which
implies that zY /k = z. Hence, the marginal product of capital is constant. This
implies that γ(I) is constant and does not change with I when the optimal automation
level is interior.
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CHAPTER 3:
CHANGING JOBS TO FIGHT INFLATION: LABOR
MARKET REACTIONS TO INFLATIONARY SHOCKS
by Görkem Bostancı, Ömer Koru and Sergio Villalvazo

†

3.1. Introduction
Since job switches are usually associated with wage and productivity increases1 , the
speed at which employees change employers is considered a measure of the health of
the economy. Understanding what drives differences in job-to-job transitions across
time and countries can be crucial for improving economic performance. In this chapter, we identify a novel policy tool that affects the rate of job-to-job transitions: monetary policy. When wages are not indexed to inflation2 , workers’ real wages decrease
at a faster rate in periods with unexpectedly high inflation. Therefore, potential gains
from being able to renegotiate wages are higher for workers. Workers could respond
to a positive inflationary shock by (1) increasing their search effort, thus, making it
more likely that they will receive a job offer, and (2) being less selective, i.e., accepting lower wage offers which lead to less productive matches. The first channel (search
effort, henceforth) increases the number of job transitions, while the extent to which
these transitions lead to more productive matches depends on the size of the second
channel (selectivity, henceforth). Hence, the impact of inflation shocks on output is
ambiguous and potentially depends on the size of the shock.
†University of Pennsylvania.
See e.g. Fallick and Fleischman, 2004, Christensen et al., 2005 and Jolivet, Postel-Vinay, and
J.-M. Robin, 2006. Under a large variety of theoretical models, job changes come with changes in
both wage and productivity (See Postel–Vinay and J.-.-M. Robin, 2002 and Menzio and Shi, 2011).
2
Existence of nominal frictions in wage setting has long been documented. See Appendix 3.B for
a broad overview of the evidence regarding the extent of wage indexation.
1
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We measure how unexpected inflation affects aggregate productivity through
its impact on the job search behavior of workers. We first utilize reduced-form causal
inference to argue a quantitatively meaningful change in the rate of job switches following inflation shocks. We find that a 1% decline in real wages due to an unexpected
inflation shock leads to a 7 percentage points increase in the probability of receiving
a job offer in the following six-month period. To understand the resulting change in
productivity, we build a model of directed on-the-job search with aggregate shocks.
We calibrate the model to match the empirical job switching patterns and associated
wage increases. The calibrated model suggests a non-monotonic output response following inflation shocks, suggesting both channels (search effort and selectivity) are
quantitatively meaningful.
Although unexpected inflation movements have been relatively small for the
U.S., they can imply a large drop in real wages once accumulated. Figure 3.1 summarizes this idea. The black line represents the discrepancy between the Survey of
Professional Forecasters (SPF) 1-year ahead inflation forecast versus the realized inflation. The red (green) line represents what fraction of the intended real wage is
received by a worker who signed a contract 2 (5) years ago based on SPF forecasts.
The real wage losses can be as high as 8%, and gains can be as high as 16% for some
workers3 even though the surprise inflation never exceeds 6% and is mostly below 3%
in magnitude. Hence, the output response can be large once small inflation shocks
accumulate.
This chapter is motivated by the recent finding by Moscarini and Postel-Vinay,
2017 and Karahan et al., 2017 that once job-to-job transition rates are controlled
for, unemployment-to-employment transition rates have little to no predictive power
3

See Appendix Figure 3.10 for the same plot with the Michigan Consumer Survey inflation
forecasts.
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Figure 3.1: The Discrepancy Between the SPF Forecast and Realized Inflation
Survey of Professional Forecasters vs Realized Inflation
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Note: The x-axis refers to the calendar year. The black line represents the difference between the
1-year ahead SPF forecast and the realized inflation. The values above 1 indicate inflation exceeded
forecasts. The red line represents the cumulative real wage loss for a worker who signed his contract
two years ago, based on SPF forecasts. The green line represents the cumulative real wage loss for
a worker who signed his contract five years ago, based on SPF forecasts.
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on nominal wage growth. On the other hand, the job-to-job transition rate and
nominal wage growth have a large significant positive correlation. This is at odds
with the classical Philips Curve idea where low unemployment strengthens workers’
bargaining position and puts upward pressure on wages. It rather suggests the real
threat point of the workers being switching to another job, that is, firms are more likely
to increase wages when job-to-job transitions are more likely. Our analysis confirms
the co-movement between job-to-job transitions and the inflation rate. Acknowledging
that both objects are equilibrium outcomes, we try to unpack which shocks might
be behind the positive correlation and the aggregate implications of the connection
between the two.
In the first half of the chapter, we provide three main pieces of empirical
evidence that suggest the positive correlation between inflation and the job-to-job
transition rate is driven by the positive effect of the former on the latter, rather than
the other way around. First, we run Granger Causality tests on the aggregate data as
well as panel regressions across U.S. regions and states. While inflation helps predict
future job-to-job transition rates, job-to-job transitions do not help predict future
inflation movements. Second, we use the previous estimates of structural monetary
policy shocks instead of inflation in our regressions. This analysis allows us to look
beyond the reverse causality argument, as these shocks are arguably exogenous to the
economic conditions. Our results suggest that an unexpected one percent decrease
in nominal interest rates can bring an increase in the job-to-job transition rates up
to 0.4% percent. Third, we provide some direct evidence on the mechanism using
individual-level survey data on on-the-job search behavior. We find that a cumulative
wage loss of 1% due to unexpectedly high inflation increases the likelihood of receiving
an offer by 7 percentage points and the expected number of offers by 0.17 in a sixmonth period.
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In the second half, we build a model of competitive on-the-job search with
endogenous search effort where the contract space is restricted to nominal wage contracts. The environment involves aggregate shocks to productivity where the agents
form rational expectations. In the model, the agents respond to an unexpected positive inflation shock by increasing their search effort, as the option value of search
increases4 . Simultaneously, the agents also respond by searching in markets with
lower posted wages as their current situation becomes more desperate. Hence, they
trade a higher wage for a higher probability of finding a new job. The increased search
effort leads to more frequent job-to-job transitions, which, by itself, would increase
average productivity. However, the reduced asking wage makes these transitions less
productivity-enhancing, therefore creates a force that decreases average productivity.
In short, inflationary shocks unambiguously increase job-to-job transitions while their
effect on productivity is undetermined. A preliminary calibration of the model to the
U.S. economy confirms the non-monotone response of the output. When the unexpected increase in inflation is bigger than a threshold value, the selectivity channel
starts to dominate, and the output decreases.
The proposed mechanism has important implications. First, it explains how
output response may not be monotonic in the size of the inflation shock. Thus, it
provides a bridge between seemingly disparate estimates of the literature on the real
effects of monetary policy shocks5 . Second, it provides a novel mechanism on how
monetary policy can affect the real economy in the short run. Through monetary
policy shocks, the monetary authority can improve the allocation of labor in the
economy, thus increase productivity. Third, it provides a novel channel that can
explain why some recessions are associated with a more pronounced ‘cleansing’ effect
4

See e.g., Christensen et al., 2005 and Mueller, 2010 for evidence on job search effort decreasing
as workers move up the job ladder.
5
See Wolf, 2019 for an overview of these findings.
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than others. In our model, the sign and the magnitude of the unexpected price
movement can affect both the speed and the effectiveness of job reallocation during
the recession.
This chapter is closely related to the literature that analyzes the interaction
between inflation and the efficiency of labor markets. In particular, the idea that
inflation helps reduce labor market frictions and increase productivity was first proposed by Tobin, 1995 and tested by Card and Hyslop, 1997. In this channel, nominal
downward wage rigidity can be made non-binding with a positive inflation rate that
ensures nominal rigidity doesn’t translate to a real rigidity6 . Our model incorporates this benefit of inflation, on top of our novel channel, that it incentivizes job
switches. The most closely related work to ours is by Moscarini and Postel-Vinay,
2019 (MPV henceforth), who incorporate a random on-the-job search framework into
a New Keynesian DSGE model. When job-to-job transition rates are high, employees
receive more offers, some of which are matched by the incumbent firm. Matched
offers are essentially cost shocks to the firm and it responds by raising prices. Hence,
a higher than average job-to-job transition rate brings higher than average price inflation. The mechanism in MPV and ours are complementary. MPV show how a
labor demand shock brings wage inflation and therefore price inflation. We show
how a shock to price inflation increases job-to-job transitions. Thus, our contribution is three-fold. First, our mechanism, in combination with theirs, explains how
labor demand shocks can be amplified through a combination of offer matching and
changing search behavior. Second, shocks to price inflation can also trigger this cycle.
Third, the monetary policy recommendations could change 7 . because the monetary
6

Lunnemann and Wintr, 2010 find real wage rigidity is indeed more substantial in Luxembourg
where there is a state-imposed automatic wage indexation.
7
Tom Fairless of the Wall Street Journal, in his article based on the results by MPV, argues
“If workers are less willing to switch jobs, central banks could press harder on the gas pedal
to stimulate the economy without worrying about inflation. And there may be little policy-
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authority needs to consider the job switching response to predict the response of the
real economy. MPV assumes on-the-job search effort is fixed, hence shuts down our
channel by assumption8 . The empirical evidence in Section 3.2 favors our channel if
one or the other has to be picked.
This chapter also contributes to the literature on the efficiency of job reallocation. This literature asks when reallocation is productivity-enhancing and when it
is not. A broad finding is that U.S. recessions were accompanied with productivityenhancing job reallocation until the great recession9 while the reallocation during the
great recession was both slower and less productivity-enhancing (Mukoyama, 2014
and Foster, Grim, and J. Haltiwanger, 2016). J. C. Haltiwanger et al., 2018 asks
whether the decline is due to a decreased number of transitions or a smaller productivity gain conditional on making a transition and finds most of the decline comes from
the latter. Caballero and Hammour, 1994 discusses potential frictions that may create inefficient job reallocation during recessions. Barlevy, 2003 emphasizes increased
credit market frictions while Ouyang, 2009 suggests early exits as mechanisms large
enough to reverse the ‘cleansing’ effect of the recessions10 . Gautier, Teulings, and
Van Vuuren, 2010, in a model with on-the-job search, analyzes which wage-setting
makers can do to influence the job-switching rate except to watch it.” (2019, Nov 17 https:
//www.wsj.com/articles/one-explanation-for-weak-wage-growth-workers-reluctanceto-switch-jobs-11573999201?shareToken=st5a849d04f72440fca240048db4bad6d1).
Our
mechanism suggests there is a direct link from monetary policy shocks to job-to-job transition rates.
8
Incorporating the search effort channel in their model is not trivial. In MPV, only the distribution of productivities across jobs is a state variable while adding the search effort makes the joint
distribution of wages and productivities a state variable. The surplus function is not sufficient to
characterize the transitions either because the search effort choice is not efficient due to the restricted
contract space. Hence, the tricks in Lise and J.-M. Robin, 2017 cannot be used to simplify the problem. Our model avoids this issue by utilizing the block-recursivity of competitive search where the
distributions are no longer state variables. We present a version of our model under random search
in Appendix 3.E
9
See e.g. Davis and J. Haltiwanger, 1992, Caballero and Hammour, 1994, Davis, Faberman, and
J. Haltiwanger, 2006 and (Davis, Faberman, and J. Haltiwanger, 2012).
10
Foster, J. Haltiwanger, and Syverson, 2008 shows if pricing decisions are not taken into account, the effect of demand and productivity shocks on profitability can be confounded. Thus, the
reallocation that is only profitability enhancing can be mislabeled as productivity-enhancing.
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mechanisms generate socially efficient job switches. They conclude, for social efficiency, the hiring premium (to induce the worker to undertake search) should equal
the no-quit premium (to prevent the worker from making a job switch later) which
happens in wage posting with commitment but not in wage bargaining or the sequential auctions of Postel–Vinay and J.-.-M. Robin, 2002. The competitive search
framework we use also satisfies the efficiency requirement posited here; the inefficient
switches in our setting are purely due to nominal frictions. The closest papers to ours
in this literature are by Moscarini, 2001 and Barlevy, 2002. Moscarini, 2001 considers
a trade-off similar to ours. In his model, similar to the competitive search models,
workers decide between a good match with a long queue and a mediocre match with
a short queue. Thus, in tight labor markets, the initial matches are of higher quality
and the reallocation is slow. Barlevy, 2002 shows decreasing job-to-job transitions
during recessions can generate an effect large enough to offset the ‘cleansing’ effect of
recessions. In his model, after a bad productivity shock, firms post fewer vacancies,
which reduces the rate of job-to-job transitions, thus the productive reallocation of
workers in the economy. In contrast, our model focuses on the effect of the inflationary shocks and generates productivity drops even when the reallocation rate is
higher.
Lastly, our mechanism is also related to the literature that analyzes how the
extent of wage flexibility affects the output response to monetary policy shocks. Olivei
and Tenreyro, 2007 shows that the effects of monetary policy shocks depend on their
timing during the year, and it is consistent with the fact that a significant fraction
of firms renegotiates wage contracts at the end of the year. Björklund, Carlsson, and
Nordström Skans, 2019 find that the output response to monetary policy is bigger
in periods where a larger fraction of wage contracts are nominally fixed, using a
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micro-level dataset on details of collective wage agreements in Sweeden11 .
We proceed with the description of the data used. Section 3.2 provides the
empirical analysis. Section 3.3 lays down the model and provides the theoretical
results. Quantitative results of the model are presented in Section 3.4.

3.2. Empirical Analysis
This section presents three types of evidence to argue that the positive correlation
between inflation and job-to-job transitions stems from the causal effect of inflation
on job-to-job transitions. First, subsection 3.2.1 uses the time-series structure of the
data to show that a high inflation today predicts a high job-to-job transition rate in
the future. In contrast, a high job-to-job transition rate today does not predict high
inflation in the future. For this aim, both Vector Auto Regressions with aggregate
data and panel regressions with state-level data are used. Second, subsection 3.2.2
uses popular estimates of structural Monetary Policy shocks to get a causal estimate
of the effect of inflation on job-to-job transitions and confirms that higher inflation
causes higher job-to-job transitions. Third, subsection 3.2.3 provides direct evidence
on how inflation increases the job search effort of the employed from survey data. We
later use the estimates from this subsection to discipline the macro model.

3.2.1. Predictive Regressions
This subsection presents findings from three datasets: (1) national monthly job-to-job
transition and inflation series between 1995-2018, (2) national yearly series between
1976-2018, and (3) quarterly state-level series between 2000-2018. All three analyses
use different periods due to data limitations but support the same argument: higher
inflation predicts higher job-to-job transitions in the future, while higher job-to-job
transitions do not predict higher inflation.
11

See also Benabou, 1992 and Diamond, 1993 for how inflation affects search effort in product
markets.
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Following Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2019, we will use a variable called ‘acceptance rate’ as introduced therein. This variable is the ratio of the job-to-job
transition rate to the unemployment-to-employment transition rate. The division is
to ensure that employees’ willingness to switch jobs is isolated from job availability,
which moves both rates simultaneously. The ‘acceptance rate’ is a natural candidate
for what our mechanism is about; higher inflation affects job-to-job transitions by
changing the employees’ willingness to switch12 .
The other primary variable we construct is called ‘inflation mistake’ and is
defined as the discrepancy between the expected and the realized inflation for one
year. At a time t, this measures the accumulated unexpected price movement since
time t − 1.
Monthly Analysis, Nation Level
In this section, we use the series made available by Fujita, Moscarini, and PostelVinay, 201913 that covers the period from September 1995 to December 2018 for the
monthly job-to-job transition rates. Over-the-year log changes in the Consumer Price
Index (CPI) provide price inflation. Inflation expectations are taken from the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers. We take logs of all labor market variables,
and HP filter all variables with a smoothing parameter of 8.1 × 106 as in Moscarini
and Postel-Vinay, 2019.
The Granger Causality test rejects if the lags of variable x help predict variable
y above and beyond the lags of variable y. We find inflation Granger causes job-to-job
transition rates with 5% significance, while the other direction shows no predictive
12
In MPV, the acceptance rate is primarily determined by the position of the workforce in the
job ladder. Since the search effort of the employed is not a choice, and the switches are exogenous,
no other model component can affect the acceptance rate once conditioned on the distribution of
workers across jobs.
13
See Appendix 3.A for details on the data sources used throughout the empirical analysis.
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Figure 3.2: National Predictive Regressions
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Note: The left panel presents the coefficient estimates and the associated 95% CI for β where price
inflation is regressed on the ‘acceptance rate’ with the specification in Equation 3.1. Each point
corresponds to an estimate where the associated lag is on the x-axis. The right panel provides the
same plot where the ‘acceptance rate’ is regressed on the price inflation. See Appendix 3.A for
details of the data sources.

relationship.
We continue by replicating the analysis inMoscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2019
that questions and rejects a price Philips curve. Specifically, we run OLS regressions
of the form:

yt = βxt−L + γZt−L + t

(3.1)

Firstly, we set the price inflation as y and the acceptance rate as x and then
switch their places. The unemployment rate and unemployment-to-employment transition rate constitute Z in both types of regressions. We vary L from 0 to 36 months
and analyze how β changes. Figure 3.2 presents the results of this analysis. The
left panel indicates no significant relationship between the lags of the acceptance rate
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and the CPI inflation, where most of the estimates up to 2,5 years are negative. On
the other hand, as shown in the right panel, a higher CPI inflation predicts a higher
‘acceptance rate’ 15 to 36 months after14 .
Quarterly Analysis, State Level
Here we utilize the Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics (LEHD) data set by
the U.S. Census. The LEHD provides publicly available job-to-job transition rates
in quarterly frequency at the state level starting from 2000. This structure allows
using the state-level variation in prices and job-to-job transitions15 . Unfortunately,
the state-level inflation data is only available in yearly frequency and starts from
200816 . Therefore, we use state-level wage inflation data from the Quarterly Census
of Employment and Wages (QCEW) as a proxy. We take logs and four-quarter
trailing moving averages of all labor market variables, and HP filter all variables
with a smoothing parameter of 105 as in Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2019. We then
combine all the data and run OLS regressions of the form:

yit = βxit−L + γyit−L + υi + νt it

(3.2)

where we analyze the lead-lag relationship between the wage inflation and the ‘acceptance rate’17 . υi and νt denote the state and time fixed effects. The results are in
Figure 3.3. Our mechanism would be able to explain both panels. The search effort
14

Potential causal channels in either direction would take some time to show up in the data. In our
mechanism, workers need to realize the real wage changes and manage to find a job after increasing
their search effort before a change in job-to-job transition numbers can be observed. Similarly, under
the classical menu cost assumptions, the mechanism argued by Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2019
requires firms to adjust their prices after their labor costs go up.
15
CPS, which is monthly, provides information regarding the location of the participant. However,
once the sample is divided into job switchers across states, the sample size becomes an issue.
16
See Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) by State in https://apps.bea.gov/regional/
downloadzip.cfm.
17
The results are robust to removing the fixed-effects or yit−L from the right-hand side of (3.2).
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Figure 3.3: State-Level Predictive Regressions
y=Wage Inflation
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Note: The left panel presents the coefficient estimates and the associated 95% CI for β where wage
inflation is regressed on the ‘acceptance rate’ with the specification in Equation 3.2. Each point
corresponds to an estimate where the associated lag is on the x-axis. The right panel provides the
same plot where the ‘acceptance rate’ is regressed on the wage inflation. See Appendix 3.A for
details of the data sources.

channel would suggest wage inflation be a positive predictor of the ‘acceptance rate’
through its effect on price inflation. On the other hand, the job ladder channel, which
is first proposed by MPV, would suggest the ‘acceptance rate’ be a negative predictor
of wage inflation. If the ‘acceptance rate’ is high, workers are at the bottom of the
ladder, and switches come with small wage improvements.

3.2.2. Structural Monetary Policy Shocks
Although the results in Section 3.2.1 are suggestive, they do not prove any causal
relationship between inflation and job-to-job transitions. Here, we use structural
estimates of monetary policy shocks as exogenous proxies for the inflation level. Our
mechanism would imply a negative relationship between nominal interest rate shocks
and job-to-job transitions.
We use several popular monetary policy shock estimates in the literature. The
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first measure is computed from narrative records of FOMC meetings and internal
forecasts of Federal Reserve by C. D. Romer and D. H. Romer, 2004, which is updated
until 2007 by Wieland and Yang, 2016. The second measure is by Barakchian and
Crowe, 2013 that uses Fed Funds futures to see exogenous changes in policy. The third
measure is by Sims and Zha, 2006, who use structural VAR estimates to identify
shocks to monetary policy. Fourth, fifth and sixth measures are by Gertler and
Karadi, 2015 and Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018 who use high-frequency movements
in financial series during FOMC announcements to identify monetary policy shocks18 .
The periods that match with the availability of job-to-job transitions data are all
different across these measures, but results from regressions with all measures are
consistent.

yt = βxt−L + t .

(3.3)

Here, the majority of the coefficients are negative as expected. Furthermore,
all but one of the significant coefficients are negative. These results further add to
the evidence in support of our theory, that is, higher price inflation leads to higher
job-to-job transitions.

3.2.3. Survey Evidence on Search Effort
The analysis here utilizes the Job Search supplement of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York Survey of Consumer Expectations (SCE)19 . We use the publicly available
data from 2013 to 2016. The Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), which is
18

Readers should refer Ramey, 2016 for an excellent review on these and other monetary policy
shock estimation methods.
19
The SCE is administered monthly as a rotating panel, and the Job Search supplement adds
detailed questions on job search behavior in the October survey. Since no respondent stays in the
SCE for more than a year, the supplement becomes a repeated cross-section.
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Figure 3.4: Monetary Policy Shocks and Acceptance Rate
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Note: Each panel presents the coefficient estimates and the associated 95% CI for β where ‘acceptance rate’ is regressed on a structural monetary policy shock estimate with the specification in
Equation 3.3. Each point and the bar correspond to an estimate where the regressors are with the
associated lag in the x-axis. See Appendix 3.A for details of the data sources.
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administered quarterly, provides one-year ahead inflation expectations20 .
To understand the effect of inflation on job search effort, the ideal measure
would be the accumulated real wage loss (or gain) the agent has due to unexpected
price movements. This object, unfortunately, is not available at the individual level.
We instead use another object denoted as ιi :

ιi =

τsi
Y
1 + it
1 + îτ0i
t=τ0i

(3.4)

where τ0i and τsi denote the dates individual i started her job and took the survey,
respectively. it denotes the realized CPI inflation rate and ît denotes the SPF inflation
expectations at date t. If the realized sequence of inflation rates is higher (lower)
than the inflation expectations in the beginning, then the agent’s real wage will be
less (more) than intended, and ιi will be larger. At the individual level, this measure
only requires the job-start date of the worker, which is available in SCE.
The measure also has two main drawbacks. First, if the contract is renegotiated
after the start date, the measure will break down. To alleviate this issue, we will
focus on individuals who started their current job recently21 . Second, SPF inflation
expectations are only available at 1-year and 10-year horizons. Thus, we assume
that inflation expectations n year ahead are the same as the 1-year ahead inflation
repeating itself n times.
In the regressions below, we will restrict attention to full-time employees with
a single job, who are (1) searching for another full-time job, (2) have been working for
at least a year, and (3) the reason for the search is not a firing notice or a non-work
20

Although the SCE provides the inflation expectations of each respondent, we believe the relevant
inflation expectation that shapes a wage bargaining process is the one given by the firms and the
policymakers.
21
We will use workers with tenures for less than five years to have a compromise between guaranteeing that the start date is the last negotiation date and keeping a large sample.
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related reason.
The empirical design we will use is of the form:

yi = β0 + β1 ιi + β2 ln(tenure) + γτ0i + ατsi + βXi + i

(3.5)

where γτ0i and ατsi denote fixed effects for the job-start year and the survey year,
respectively. X includes demographic controls for age, gender, education, and marital
status. yi denotes outcome variables measuring the extent of the search effort. In our
exercise, we will use the number of offers received and a dummy variable for whether
any offers were received in the past six months22 .
The identification idea is built on the random sampling of the surveys. Conditional on a job-start date, the survey dates of individuals are randomly assigned
barring survival bias. Once we control for the job start and survey years and the
tenure of the worker, we can treat ιi as randomly assigned23 . Figure 3.5 presents the
histogram of ιi values in the final sample.
Table 3.1 presents the results for an Ordinary Least Squares and a Linear
Probability Model. The results indicate that unexpected inflation increases the likelihood of receiving an offer as well as the number of offers received at a 5% level. The
‘Wage Mistake’ variable is a ratio and is expected to be centered around 1. According
to our estimates, a 1% positive inflation shock translates to a 7.9% higher probability
of receiving an offer and 0.17 more offers on average. Later in Section 3.4, we will use
these coefficients to validate our model’s ability to assess the relationship between
22

SCE has other potential outcome variables such as the number of employers applied and the
hours spent searching. However, any measure that quantifies effort through intermediate steps
requires caution. The time spent searching or employers contacted are highly related to whether the
specific type of effort translates into offers. For example, a high amount of time spent might indicate
an employee’s inefficient search strategies. Similarly, a large number of employers contacted might
indicate a quantity/quality trade-off in the application strategy.
23
According to our identification argument, the demographic controls are also not strictly required.
We include them only to reduce the regression variance. Including them has minimal effect on our
quantitative results.
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Figure 3.5: Histogram of ιi Values

inflation and job-to-job transitions correctly.
Table 3.1: The Effect of Inflation on Search Effort
Dependent variable:
Number of Offers Received

Received (0-1)

(1)

(2)

WageMistake

17.395∗∗
(7.293)

7.920∗∗
(3.991)

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 358)
F Statistic (df = 15; 358)

374
0.189
0.155
0.536
5.555∗∗∗

374
0.082
0.043
0.293
2.118∗∗∗

∗

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Note: Each column presents the coefficient estimate for β1 and the associated standard error with
the specification in Equation 3.5. The independent variable is ιi as constructed in Equation 3.4.
The dependent variables are the number of offers received and whether an offer was received by the
respondent in the past six months respectively. The controls whose estimates are excluded from
the table are job-start date, survey date, tenure, age, gender, education, and marital status. See
Appendix 3.A for details of the data sources.
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3.3. The Model
3.3.1. Environment
The environment has two main frictions that are required to generate monetary nonneutrality. First, firms and employees are not allowed to sign state-contingent contracts. Second, search frictions prevent perfect competition in the labor markets.
Therefore, shocks to inflation introduce shifts in the real wages of existing employees.
Since employed also search on the job, the model exhibits monetary non-neutrality
even though the wages of new hires are completely flexible. If all labor contracts
were inflation-adjusted or labor markets were competitive, our model would exhibit
monetary neutrality.
Here, we describe an environment where all variables are real. We then introduce shocks to the real wages of existing employees as inflation shocks and match
these shocks to the discrepancy between the inflation forecasts and the realized inflation in the data. This will allows us to avoid nominal variables in our modeling
which can be conceptualized as a limit of the classical New Keynesian model where
pricing frictions go to zero24 .
Preferences
The economy consists of a continuum of individuals with measure one and a continuum of firms with positive measure. Both the workers and the firms are risk-neutral
and maximize the expected discounted income/profits. Time is discrete, and firms
and workers share the same discount factor, β ∈ (0, 1).
24

We choose to avoid
to isolate the effects of
moving parts. Second,
break block-recursivity.

a full New Keynesian structure with pricing frictions. First, this allows us
inflation through the labor market, without having to worry about other
once included, pricing frictions require dynamically optimizing firms that
Thus, we would be forced to use Taylor approximations to solve the model.
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Production Technology
There is a single homogeneous consumption good in the economy. When a worker
and a firm match, they produce y + z units of output. The first component, y, is the
aggregate productivity, and it is the same across firms. The second component, z,
is match-specific. Upon meeting, z is drawn from a distribution G and remains the
same until separation.
Unemployed workers produce b units of output.
Meeting Technology
Workers and firms need to find each other to produce. Search is directed, and markets
are indexed by the value offered by a firm to a worker. We denote submarkets by
X ∈ R.
Both unemployed and employed workers can search for a job. After they
choose in which submarket to search for a job, workers choose the search effort, e.
The cost of exerting effort is denoted by c(e) and it is a strictly increasing and convex
function with the following properties: c(0) = 0, c0 (0) = 025 .
Firms also choose in which submarket to post their vacancies. The cost of
opening a vacancy for one period is κ > 0.
In a submarket, firms and workers meet each other via a constant returns to
scale matching function, M . Given v measure of vacancies and E unit of total search
effort, there are M (v, E) measure of matches. Constant returns to scale assumption
implies that market tightness θ, i.e. vacancy-to-total search effort ratio, is sufficient
to characterize the probability of matching. Specifically, a worker that exerts e unit
of search effort finds a job with probability ep(θ), where p : R → [0, 1] is a strictly
25

We consider the search cost as a utility cost, thus it doesn’t appear in the output calculations.
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increasing and concave function with following properties: p(0) = 0, p(x) → 1 as
x → ∞. On the other hand, a vacancy meets a worker with probability q(θ), where
q : R → [0, 1] is a strictly decreasing function with the following property: θq(θ) =
p(θ).
After a firm and a worker meets, they draw match productivity z and decide
whether to form a match or not.
Wage Setting
The contract space is limited to fixed-wage contracts. In other words, if a firm and
a worker meet in a submarket X and decide to form a match, then the firm offers
a wage rate w that provides an expected lifetime utility of X to a worker, taking
into consideration the search effort cost and the separation risk (either exogenous or
through the worker finding a better job). X and the aggregate state are sufficient to
pin down the wage since it depends on future lifetime utility X, not past outcomes.
Also, the match productivity does not affect the lifetime value of the worker since
it is constant throughout the firm-worker match. Let ψ be the aggregate state of
the economy, which consists of aggregate productivity y and distribution of workers
across jobs and wages Γ(z, w)26 . We denote the entry wage of a worker in submarket
X when the aggregate state is ψ by h(X, ψ).
Timeline
Each period is divided into five sub-periods. In the first sub-period, aggregate productivity y is drawn. In the second sub-period, exogenous separations occur with
probability δ ∈ (0, 1). In the third sub-period, workers choose where to search and
how much effort to exert. In this stage, workers who were separated from their job in
26

Unlike Menzio and Shi, 2011, the wage distribution matters for determining future tightness
because it determines the aggregate search effort.
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the current period cannot search for a job; they remain unemployed with probability
one. In the fourth sub-period, workers and firms meet and decide whether to form a
match. In the last sub-period, production takes place, and wages are paid.
Discussion of the Model Elements
While setting the environment, we make five main simplifications. Four of them are
innocuous while the fifth is not.
First, we denote all the variables in real terms. Second, we avoid modeling
an inflation process with rational expectations over it. Third, we assume fixed-wage
contracts although all that is needed for the mechanism is that they are not statecontingent. In principle, we can focus on nominal wages, allow an inflation process
that follows an AR(∞) and contracts that are functions of time. In that scenario,
employees and firms could sign contracts that take the expected future inflation into
account and designate an associated increase in nominal wages over time. Therefore,
nominal wages would follow a path that leaves the real wages constant over time
absent shocks to inflation and aggregate productivity. Using the real wages as the
model element allows us to abstract from the expected paths of the nominal variables
and focus on the shocks to the inflation process. None of these three simplifications
have a bearing on the final results while they simplify the notation greatly.
Fourth, we don’t allow firms to make counter offers for their poached employees. In theory, this might result in workers moving to jobs with lower productivity
than their current jobs, which wouldn’t happen if the incumbent firms could respond.
We make the assumption for computational simplicity. More importantly, in our
quantitative exercise, we don’t observe this behavior with the calibrated parameters.
Therefore, allowing the firms to respond should have no quantitative effect on our
results.
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The fourth simplification, namely, treating inflation as an exogenous process,
is not completely innocuous. In a fully-fledged New Keynesian model, output shocks
and monetary shocks both contribute to determining inflation. Therefore, treating
the inflation shocks as completely independent from output shocks would not be
entirely correct. On the other hand, introducing firms that price dynamically would
break the block-recursivity of the equilibrium. Thus, whenever we draw conclusions
from the past data, we will not only rely on the inflation series. Instead, we will focus
on the discrepancy between the inflation expectations and the realized inflation while
remaining agnostic on how these expectations are formed in the economy.

3.3.2. Equilibrium
Problem of a Firm
Since the production technology is constant returns to scale, the size of the firm is
indeterminate. Hence, we consider single vacancy firms. Let K(w, z, ψ) be the value
function of a filled vacancy with match productivity z, wage rate w, and aggregate
state ψ. Observe that a firm is willing to form a match in submarket X if and only
if the match productivity z satisfies K(h(X, ψ), z, ψ) ≥ 0. Since the firm value is
increasing in z, define z such that K(h(X, ψ), z, ψ) = 0. If such z exists, the expected
value of finding a worker is:
Z
J(X, ψ) =

K(h(X, ψ), z, ψ)dG(z).
z≥z

The free entry condition implies that

k ≥ q(θ)J(X, ψ),

(3.6)

where the left-hand side is the cost of vacancy, and the right-hand side is the expected
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value of a vacancy, which is the product of the probability of finding a worker and
the expected value of a filled vacancy. This condition holds with equality whenever
there is a positive mass of workers searching for a job in submarket X. Hence, there
is a one-to-one relationship between market tightness θ and (X, ψ). Hence, we can
write θ(X, ψ) as the market tightness in active submarkets.
Let p̄(H(w, ψ), ψ) be the probability that a worker leaves the job when his
lifetime value is H(w, ψ) and the aggregate state is ψ. Then,
K(w, z, ψ) = y + z − w + β(1 − δ)E [(1 − p̄(H(w, ψ 0 ), ψ 0 )K(w, z, ψ)] .

(3.7)

The model has endogenous separations, which affect the wage-setting problem in a non-trivial way. In a search model where job switches are efficient, a la
Postel–Vinay and J.-.-M. Robin, 2002, the probability of losing a worker is completely exogenous. Thus, the protocol of the sequential auction dictates firms to pay
the minimum wage that will allow them to keep/attract the worker. Once search
effort is introduced, firms may want to offer a wage that is more than absolutely
needed to reduce the incentives of the worker to exert search effort and attract more
offers. This kills the simple structure of the protocol of the sequential auction. The
additional complication is smaller in a directed search framework, however, results in
a firm value function K that is not monotone in the wage (or value) offered.
Problem of Unemployed Worker
Consider an unemployed worker. We write down the problem of the unemployed right
before the production sub-period. The value function of an unemployed worker is
h
i
U (ψ) = b + βE max eR(ψ 0 , U ) − c(e) + U (ψ 0 ) ,
e
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(3.8)

where R(ψ, V ) is return to searching in the optimal submarket for an agent with
lifetime value of V :

R(ψ, V ) = max p(θ(ψ, X))(X − V )(1 − G(z(ψ, X)))
x

e does not appear in R(ψ, X) because search effort is exerted after the choice of
submarket27 . After the choice of the submarket, the worker chooses an effort level to
maximize the term inside the brackets in (3.9).
Problem of an Employed Worker
Similarly, we can define the value function of an employed worker as:
h
i
H(w, ψ) = w + βE δU (ψ 0 ) + (1 − δ) max(eR(ψ 0 , H(w, ψ 0 )) − c(e) + H(w, ψ 0 )) .
e

(3.9)
Equilibrium Definition
Following Menzio and Shi, 2011, we consider block recursive equilibria. In a blockrecursive equilibrium, policy functions do not depend on the distribution of workers
across jobs. Hence, the only relevant aggregate variable is aggregate productivity y,
i.e., ψ = y 28 .
A block-recursive equilibrium consists of a market tightness function θ : Y ×
R → R+ , a value function for the unemployed U : Y → R, a value function for the
employed H : R+ ×Y → R, a value function for the firm K : R+ ×Z ×Y → R, optimal
choice of submarket m : R × Y → R, optimal choice of search effort e : R × Y → R+ ,
27

Since a worker is measure zero, his choice of e does not affect θ, hence it does not affect the
choice of the submarket.
28
Since the search effort choice is an innocuous extension of the framework in Menzio and Shi,
2010, we do not prove the existence and uniqueness of the block-recursive equilibrium here. Schaal,
2017 provides a discussion of the possible scenarios where block-recursivity may fail.
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entry wage h : R × Y → R and the cutoff for match productivity z : R × Y → R+
such that:
1. z(X, ψ) satisfies K(h(X, ψ), z, ψ) = 0,
2. entry wage h(X, ψ) solves H(h, ψ) = X,
3. H(w, ψ) satisfies (3.9), U (ψ) satisfies (3.8), K(w, z, ψ) satisfies (3.7) where probability that a worker finds a job is
p̄(w, ψ) = e(m(H(w, ψ), ψ))p(θ(ψ, m(H(w, ψ), ψ)))(1 − G(z)),
4. e(V, ψ) and m(V, ψ) solve worker’s problem,
5. θ(ψ, X) satisfies the free entry condition (3.6).

3.3.3. Effect of a Decrease in Real Wage
What happens if a worker’s real wage decreases for some exogenous reason, for example, inflation? In this section, we show that there are two competing mechanisms:
a decrease in selectivity in on-the-job search and an increase in the search effort.
First, we prove that when a worker’s current lifetime utility decreases, she searches
in a lower-valued submarket, which has a lower cutoff for match-specific productivity.
Second, we prove that the worker increases the search effort.
Lemma 9. z(X, ψ) is increasing in promised lifetime utility X.
This lemma states that as the promised lifetime utility increases, to form a
match, a better match-specific productivity draw is needed. The intuition is clear:
if a firm promises higher value, its lifetime value decreases. Hence, at the marginal
match-specific productivity, the firm starts making a loss. Therefore, the firm is more
selective in high indexed markets.
Lemma 10. m(V, ψ) is increasing in current lifetime utility V .
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This lemma states that workers with low current lifetime utility search in a
market that promises lower lifetime utility compared to a worker with higher current
lifetime utility. This mechanism implies a job ladder, workers start from the bottom
and get better lifetime utilities as they find new jobs and climb the job ladder.
Lemma 11. R(ψ, V ) is decreasing in current lifetime utility V .
As a worker’s current lifetime utility increases, there is a lower gain from
finding a better job. Hence, return to searching for a job increases. This mechanism
also implies that search effort is decreasing with lifetime value.
Lemma 12. e(V, ψ) is decreasing in current lifetime utility V .
Lemmas 9 and 10 show that a worker with a lower current lifetime utility search
in a lower indexed submarket, in which cutoff for the match-specific productivity is
lower. Hence, if a worker’s wage decreases, the expected productivity of her next
job is lower than the expected productivity in the market she previously searched
in29 . On the other hand, Lemma 12 shows that the worker increases his search effort.
Hence, the probability of moving to a better job increases.
At the micro-level, inflation has a direct impact on an individual’s lifetime
utility. However, at the macro level, inflation does not have a direct effect, i.e., if
workers do not change their behavior, there would be no change in the aggregate
output. However, due to these two competing channels, the aggregate output might
decrease or increase in the short run due to inflation. One-time inflation shock does
not have an impact on the steady-state, thus, there are no long-run implications.
If the first channel dominates, workers end up with lower match-specific productivities, which leads to lower aggregate output. If the second channel dominates,
29

There might even be a probability that she ends up at a worse job than the current one she has.
In the calibrated model, we don’t observe this possibility.
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workers increase their search effort and form new matches with higher match productivity. This mechanism leads to higher aggregate output. Therefore, the impact of an
inflation shock is ambiguous. We proceed to quantify the importance of each channel
in Section 3.4.

3.4. Quantitative Analysis
This section presents the preliminary calibration strategy and the quantitative results.

3.4.1. Calibration Strategy
For the output predictions to have a quantitative interpretation, two implied elasticities should be plausible: (1) the response of job-to-job transitions to an inflationary
shock and (2) the response of aggregate output to job-to-job transitions. We measure
the former elasticity from micro-data that documents how workers adjust their search
behavior with inflationary shocks (see Section 3.A). The latter can be inferred from
wage increases following job switches and a measure of how surplus is shared between
firms and workers. Although matching these two elasticities is necessary for pinning
down the output response, it is not sufficient. The response of the aggregate output
to job-to-job transitions depends on the underlying reasons for these transitions. The
output response following increased transitions due to a labor demand shock does
not necessarily equal the response due to an inflationary shock. Thus, it is crucial
to model these two together instead of stitching two elasticities that are computed
separately.
We use a telephone-line matching function: p(θ) = θ (1 + θγ )−1/γ 30 and assume
the match specific productivity distribution G follows a Pareto distribution with location parameter zmin and shape parameter zshape . Lastly, we assume a quadratic
search cost function c(e) = Ae2 where the level potentially differs for the employed
30

The telephone-line matching function, proposed by Stevens, 2007, is a flexible matching function
that has the Cobb-Douglas as a special case.
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Ae and the unemployed Au .
The full set of parameters necessary to compute the model is the vector:

Ω = {β, δ, γ, κ, Ae , Au , b, zm in, zs hape, ρy , σy }.

(3.10)

The model period is taken to be a month. We normalize zm in to equal the unemployment benefit replacement rate, calibrate β and δ externally, and calibrate the
remaining parameters internally. We calibrate the parameters to match the steadystate moments, except for the parameters that determine the process of aggregate
productivity process. Then, we calibrate the aggregate productivity process to match
the business cycle statistics.
We set the monthly discount factor β = 0.951/12 and exogenous separation
rate δ = 0.011 consistent with the average EU rate in 2005 (Fallick and Fleischman,
2004).
Calibration Idea
The model doesn’t admit an analytic expression for the steady-state distribution
of workers across jobs, hence we stick to discussing the broad intuition of how the
moments inform the parameter values. The calibration uses all moments to discipline
all parameters since general equilibrium effects through market tightness prevent
isolating the response of different moments.
The residual wage distribution informs the match productivity distribution
zshape , and the flow benefit of unemployment b. The flow benefit disciplines the left
tail because the wage bargaining between the firm and an unemployed worker depends
on the outside option of the worker. The right tail depends on how large the match
productivity can be, hence on zshape .
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Table 3.2: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter
γ Match. Funct. Elasticity
Ae for employed
Au for unemployed
b Unemployment Flow
zshape
κ Vacancy Cost

Value
3
0.066
4.5
5.50
1.95
0.066

Moment
UE
EE
labor share
residual log wage q75
residual log wage q25
median tenure

Data
0.30
0.024
0.60
0.54
-0.32
48

Model
0.30
0.016
0.60
0.32
-0.2679
31

Source
Shimer ’05
Shimer ’05
CPS
CPS
CPS

Note: All parameters in the table are jointly calibrated to match all the moments. The last column
provides an intuitive mapping between the parameters and the moments that are most related. Avg.
labor prod. is constructed by HP filtering the logged series with smoothing parameter 105 . In order
to construct the residual wage distribution, we first construct an hourly wage measure by dividing
the weekly wage by the usual hours worked. Then, we regress the hourly wage on age, age squared,
gender, race, marital status, and education level in the cross-section for each month of 2005 in CPS.
Lastly, we take the average of the quantiles of the distributions of residuals from each regression.

The employment-to-employment (EE) and the unemployment-to-employment
(UE) transition rates inform the search effort cost level parameters for the employed
Ae and the unemployed Au respectively. A higher transition rate implies a lower cost.
The labor share disciplines the vacancy cost κ, hence the surplus sharing between the firm and the worker in the model. A higher labor share implies a low κ.
Lastly, the median tenure helps discipline the matching function elasticity γ. As the
elasticity gets larger, firms become more aggressive with the wage postings and the
median tenure goes down.
Calibration Results
The calibrated parameters together with the matched moments are given in Table
3.2.

3.4.2. Unexpected Inflation Shock
This section presents how the economy responds to unexpected shocks to inflation of
different sizes. In particular, the quantitative findings confirm the analytic results in
Section 3.3.3. While small positive inflation shocks increase the output in the short
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Figure 3.6: Impulse Responses to Inflation Shocks
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Note: Each panel presents the impulse response functions with respect to an unexpected inflation
shock of different sizes.

run, large positive inflation shocks decrease it. Negative shocks to inflation uniformly
decrease the output.
Figure 3.6 displays the impulse-responses for shocks to inflation of sizes 1 pp
and 0.5 pp. The instantaneous change in average wages reflects the size of the inflation
shock. The job-to-job transition rate increases following both shocks together with
the average on-the-job search effort. However, while the smaller shock brings a shortrun boost to output, the larger shock causes a short-run decline. Here, one important
implication of the counter-acting mechanisms manifests itself. The drop in real wages
brings the search effort up, which results in an increase in output. On the other
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hand, the same drop causes the employed to be more nervous about finding a new
job more quickly. Hence, they look for jobs in markets where it is easier to find a job,
where wages and productivity are lower as well. When the shock is small enough, the
increased number of switches dominates the fact that each switch is less productivityenhancing. When the shock gets larger, the latter channel starts to dominate and we
see a drop in output.
Since the wages of new hires are perfectly flexible, job switches undo the effects
of the one-time inflation shocks. Therefore, the model exhibits money neutrality in
the long run.

3.5. Conclusion
In this chapter, we try to understand the positive correlation between inflation and
job-to-job transitions in the economy. We first show reduced form and causal evidence
suggesting higher inflation causes more job-to-job transitions. In time-series and panel
structures, we find that shocks to inflation precede shocks to job-to-job transition
rates: lags of inflation are consistently good predictors of job-to-job transitions. In
addition, using several monetary policy shock estimates, we argue the relationship
seems to be causal and economically significant: 1% increase in the nominal interest
rate corresponds up to 6.5% decrease in job-to-job transition rates in the U.S. We
proceed by constructing a model that can explain these observations. In settings with
wage rigidities, higher than expected inflation rates increase the benefit of searching
for a job. As employees increase their search effort, more job-to-job transitions occur
and allocation of labor across firms improves in the short run. The mechanism carries
important implications for monetary policy: an expansionary monetary policy can
improve the allocation of resources in the economy and increase productivity in the
short run.
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3.A. Data Sources
Monthly Data
For the job-to-job flows, we use the series made available by Fujita, Moscarini, and
Postel-Vinay, 201931 that is computed from the Current Population Survey (CPS).
The unemployment-to-employment transition (UE) rates are from Fallick and Fleischman, 2004, similarly computed from the CPS32 . The Consumer Price Index (CPI)
inflation and the unemployment rate (U) series are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics33 . The wage inflation series is computed the same way using the ‘Average hourly earnings of production and nonsupervisory employees, total private, not
seasonally adjusted, from the Current Employment Series (CES)34 .
Yearly Data
CPS provides an approximate measure for yearly job-to-job transition rates starting
at 1976. We use the methodology proposed by Mukoyama, 2014 to deal with the time
aggregation bias introduced by a low frequency of data35 .
31
This series is based on the method introduced by Fallick and Fleischman, 2004 while
corrects for an attrition bias that starts with the changes in the survey questions in
2007 (https://sites.google.com/site/fabienpostelvinay/working-papers/EEProbability.
xlsx?attredirects=0&d=1). We repeat our empirical exercises using the original series by Fallick
and Fleischman, 2004 as a robustness check. The results are BLANK and are presented in Appendix
BLANK.
32
https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2004/200434/200434abs.html.
33
The analyses where CPI is replaced with Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE, https:
//fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PCEPI#0) provide quantitatively and qualitatively similar results.
34
https://beta.bls.gov/dataViewer/view/timeseries/CEU0500000008
35
The monthly series is based on the question introduced to CPS at 1994, that asks whether there
were any changes in the employment status of the worker since last month (”SAMEMP”). The
yearly data asks whether the employee works for the same employer as last year. If the answer is no
and there hasn’t been a long unemployment spell, there needs to be at least one switch. However,
there is no way to confirm multiple switches within a year. Furthermore, recall becomes a bigger
problem when the time period the respondent is expected to remember is further back. Although
the data quality is potentially lower due to these issues, the yearly series goes back to high inflation
periods in the U.S., thus provides important variation in inflation levels that is not present in recent
years.
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Quarterly Data
For the job-to-job flows, we use the series J2JHireR and J2JSepR which are computed
by dividing the number of hires (or separations) with no unemployment period in
between to the total labor force. The two series closely follow each other and give
very similar qualitative and quantitative results. In the main text, we focus on the
analysis with J2JSepR. LEHD does not have information on unemployed-to-employed
transition rates, therefore we use the variable NEHireR instead. This variable is
computed by dividing the number of hires (or separations) from non-employment to
the total labor force. We get state-level wage inflation data from the Quarterly Census
of Employment and Wages (QCEW). Specifically, we use the percentage change in
state-level average weekly wages between quarters t and t-4 in privately owned firms36 .
We use Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) from the BLS for state-level
unemployment and labor-force data37 .

3.B. Evidence on the Extent of Wage Indexation
Explicit measures of what fraction of wage contracts are indexed to inflation are
unavailable for the U.S. economy. The measures that are based on the actual contract
terms are restricted to collective agreements in the U.S., which vary in coverage over
the years and do not apply to a random sample of the workers. Measures based
on changes in the nominal wages are imperfect due to several other factors affecting
the wage process. However, even the most conservative estimates imply a very low
level of wage indexation (less than 25%) in developed countries. Here, we discuss the
implications of prior research on the extent of wage indexation.
36

We exclude the public sector to isolate the market forces in the wage changes. Using data from
all the firms has little impact on qualitative and quantitative outcomes.
37
See
https://www.j2jexplorer.ces.census.gov,
https://www.bls.gov/cew/
downloadable-data-files.htm , and https://www.bls.gov/lau/.
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Evidence Based on Contract Terms
The main papers on the prevalence of ‘cost-of-living adjustment’ (COLA) terms in
contracts are Card, 1990 for Canada and Ragan Jr and Bratsberg, 2000 for the U.S.
Card, 1990 looks at the universe of manufacturing union contracts (with more than
500 employees) signed between 1968 and 1983. He finds that 26% of them have
an ‘escalation clause’ on average while the explicit indexation is very rare. The
fraction with ‘escalation clause’ peaks at 65% in a period where the inflation is over
10%. Ragan Jr and Bratsberg, 2000 use the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data
on collective bargaining settlements to see the prevalence of COLA provisions. They
document that even though 61% of the settlements had COLA provisions back in
1976, it has fallen all the way to 22% in 1996 when the data is no longer available.
The COLA provisions are known to be much less prevalent among non-union workers.
With the decline in unionization, collective agreements cover a smaller fraction of the
labor force in either country today. We consider these measures as an upper bound
on the extent of wage indexation. Druant et al., 2012 utilize a firm-level survey
conducted in 17 European countries regarding wage adjustment practices. Across
15,000 firms from all industries, they document that only 11.5 % of the firms employ
any formal indexation clause in employment contracts while only 10.9% have any
informal inflation considerations in wage setting38 . More importantly, the survey also
asks about the frequency of wage adjustments. This gives us a back-of-the-envelope
mapping between the degree of indexation and the frequency of wage adjustments.
Wage adjustments happen either yearly or more frequently for 74.4% of the firms.
Thus, even when firms adjust wages frequently, this does not imply an implicit wage
indexation.
38

There is still large variation across countries. In Belgium, 98.2% of the firms have automatic
wage indexation while in Italy, only 5.8% of the firms have any form of wage indexation.
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Evidence Based on Wage Movements
McLaughlin, 1994, using PSID data, finds that the effect of unanticipated inflation
on nominal wage growth is consistent with 42% indexation between 1970 and 1986.
Hofmann, Peersman, and Straub, 2012, using a DSGE model, infers the extent of
wage indexation in the economy from the time variation in U.S. wage dynamics.
They estimate the degree of wage indexation to be 0.17 in 2000, compared to 0.91
in 1974, which is roughly in line with the time path of COLA coverage in collective
bargaining agreements39 . More recently, Grigsby, Hurst, and Yildirmaz, 2019, using
data from a payroll processing company in the U.S., found that approximately 36% of
job stayers experience no nominal wage changes in a one-year period. Once contrasted
with the evidence in Druant et al., 2012, the implied wage indexation should be less
than 11.5%.

3.C. Proofs
Lemma 9. z(X, ψ) is increasing in promised lifetime utility X.
Proof. Recall that z solves

K(h(X, ψ), z, ψ) = 0.

Clearly, as promised lifetime utility X increases, the value of the firm decreases. In
order to satisfy equality, z must be increased.

Lemma 10. m(V, ψ) is increasing in current lifetime utility V .
39

A major implication from the chapter is that wage indexation is a response to increasing monetary policy uncertainty. Thus, the level of indexation should be endogenous to run counter-factual
exercises that change monetary policy. Since we focus on one-time shocks, we abstract from endogenous indexation.
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Proof. LetVh > V` . We want to show that m(Vh , ψ) ≥ m(V` , ψ). For simplicity, we
drop the aggregate state variable, since we are only considering the change in current
lifetime utility V and denote the associated choices as mh and m` and associated
market tightness as θh and θ` . Suppose the contrary: mh < m` . This implies that
m` − Vh > mh − Vh . Since mh is the optimal choice for Vh

p(θh )(mh − Vh ) ≥ p(θ` )(m` − Vh )
=⇒ p(θh ) > p(θ` ).

Rearranging the first line also gives us:

p(θh )mh − p(θ` )m` ≥ [p(θh ) − p(θ` )]Vh .

Similarly, since m` is the optimal choice for V`

p(θ` )(m` − V` ) ≥ p(θh )(mh − V` )
[p(θh ) − p(θ` )]V` ≥ p(θh )mh − p(θ` )m` .

Using combining these two conditions:

[p(θh ) − p(θ` )]V` ≥ [p(θh ) − p(θ` )]Vh =⇒ V` ≥ Vh .

Which contradicts the assumption that Vh > V` .
Lemma 11. R(ψ, V ) is decreasing in current lifetime utility V .
Proof. By envelope theorem:

RV (ψ, V ) = −p(θ(m(V, ψ))) < 0.
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Hence, R is decreasing in V .



3.D. Solution Method
We use Value Function Iteration with 20 grid points for the distribution of z, 5 points
for the distribution of y, 200 points for the grid for V , and 600 points for the grid for
w. We define K̃(V, y, z) = K(h(V, y), y, z) for convenience and start with an initial
guess K̃ 0 (V, y, z). The algorithm works sequentially. At step i, we compute
1. J i (V, y) given K̃ i−1 (V, y, z)
2. z i (V, y) and θi (V, y) given J i (V, y)
3. U i (y), ei (V, y), Ri (V, y), and mi (V, y) given z i (V, y) and θi (V, y)
4. H i (w, y) given ei (V, y), Ri (V, y), mi (V, y), z i (V, y), θi (V, y), and U i (y)
5. K i (w, y, z) given ei (V, y), mi (V, y), z i (V, y), and θi (V, y)
6. hi (V, y) given H i (w, y)
7. K̃ i (V, y, z) given K i (w, y, z) and hi (V, y)
We stop when dmax (K̃ i (V, y, z), K̃ i−1 (V, y, z)) <  where dmax gives the maximum distance between the two vectors.

3.E. A Random Search Model with Effort
In this section, we present a random-search version of our model in Section 3.3. The
random-search version here doesn’t have the selectivity channel, since workers do not
direct their search to particular types of firms.

3.E.1. Preferences
The discrete-time economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived workers
and firms. The total measures of workers and firms are fixed and normalized to one.
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Each worker has ability x, which is distributed with cumulative distribution function
G, and each firm has productivity y, which is distributed by cumulative distribution
function Γ. Time is discrete.
Both firms and workers are risk-neutral and have the same discount factor,
β ∈ (0, 1).

3.E.2. Production Technology
There is only one consumption good in the economy. A worker-firm pair (x, y) can
produce f (x, y) output, where f is strictly increasing in both arguments and supermodular, i.e. fi (x, y) > 0 for i ∈ {x, y} and fxy (x, y) > 0, where fi is the derivative
with respect to i.
Super-modularity of f implies that output maximizing allocation is to match
high productivity workers with high productivity firms.
Each unemployed worker produces b(x) unit of output by herself. Lastly, each
worker-firm pair dissolves with probability δ in a given period.

3.E.3. Meeting Technology
In order to produce workers and firms need to find each other through random search.
Both unemployed and employed workers can search for a job. In order to
find a vacancy, workers need to exert search effort. c(e) denotes the utility cost of
exerting e units of effort for the employed. For simplicity, we assume that the search
effort of unemployed workers is fixed to 1 and there is no cost attached to this effort.
However, an employed person chooses e optimally40 . We assume c(e) is convex and
strictly increasing in e, with lime→1 c(e) → ∞ to simplify matching probabilities.
Firms, on the other hand, choose how many vacancies to open. In order to
open v units of vacancies, a firm needs to pay κ(v), where κ(v) is convex and strictly
increasing.
40

It is assumed that production level does not depend on the search behavior of the worker.
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Let E and V be the total measure of search effort and vacancies, respectively.
The total measure of matches to be formed is denoted with M (E, V ), for a given E
and V . We assume that M (E, V ) is homogeneous of degree one. Then, the measure of
matches per unit of search effort is given by M (1, E/V ). Let λ denote the probability
that one unit of search effort matches a vacancy: λ = M (E, V )/E. The probability
that a vacancy meets with a worker is given by λf = M (E, V )/V .
We define market tightness to be the measure of vacancies available per unit
search effort and denote it with θ = V /E. Homogeneity of degree one implies that
match probabilities of workers and vacancies only depend on aggregate quantities
through tightness: λ(θ) = M (θ, 1), λf (θ) = M (1, 1/θ). This implies that λf (θ) =
θλ(θ).

3.E.4. Wage Setting
Upon meeting, the firm makes a take or leave it offer to the worker. Firms can only
propose constant nominal wage contracts to workers from which workers can walk
away anytime. Contracts can be re-negotiated without cost.
Contract space is not complete. Firms cannot make wage rate contingent on
the state of the economy. Moreover, the search effort of the worker is not contractible.
Hence, when a firm makes an offer, it needs to take into account the search effort of
the worker.
When an employed worker meets with another vacancy, the incumbent firm
can make a counter-offer. As in Postel–Vinay and J.-.-M. Robin, 2002, this triggers
Bertrand competition between the incumbent firm and poaching firm.
Let Vt (w, x, y) be the lifetime utility of a worker type x who is employed at
firm y with a wage w and let Jt (w, x, y) be the present discounted profits of a firm
with productivity y that employs worker x at wage w41 . Consider two firms with
41

For brevity, instead of writing aggregate states in the value function, we index value functions
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productivity y 0 > y that are bargaining over a worker with type x. In Bertrand
competition, the maximum that a firm can offer as wage is the entire output. In such
a situation, the lifetime utility of a worker type x would be Vt (f (x, y), x, y) with firm
y. Therefore, firm y 0 should solve the following problem:
max Jt (w, x, y 0 )
w

s.t. Vt (w, x, y 0 ) ≥ Vt (f (x, y), x, y).

where constraint ensures that firm y cannot outbid the offer.
When a firm makes an offer, it needs to take into account the search effort
of the worker. Even though an increase in w decreases the output share of the firm,
it discourages the worker from searching for a job and getting new offers, which is
good for the firm. Depending on which effect dominates, value function Jt might be
increasing or decreasing with w. To simplify the model, as in Postel-Vinay and J.-M.
Robin, 2004, we assume that Jt (w, x, y) is a decreasing function of w.
Assumption 1. Jt (w, x, y) is a decreasing function of w.
This assumption implies that constraint must hold with equality since Vt (w, x, y)
is increasing in w.
There are three possibilities for a worker employed at a firm with productivity
y. First, she might match with a firm that has higher productivity, y 0 > y. In this
case, the high productive firm wins the bargaining and the worker changes his job.
The worker’s lifetime utility becomes V (f (x, y), x, y)42 . Let φ(x, y, y 0 ) be the wage
that solves V (φ(x, y, y 0 ), x, y 0 ) = V (f (x, y), x, y). In other words, π(x, y, y 0 ) is the
wage rate of worker type x when she moves from y to y 0 .
with the time subscript.
42
Here, since all comparisons happen at the same aggregate state, we suppress the time subscripts
to reduce notation.
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In the second case, the worker matches with a firm that has lower productivity,
y > y 00 , however, the poaching firm can offer higher lifetime utility to the worker than
she currently has. In this case, the poacher cannot win the bargaining, though bargaining increases the wage of the worker in the current firm. In this case, the worker’s
lifetime utility increases to V (f (x, y 00 ), x, y 00 ) and her wage increases to π(x, y 00 , y).
The second case can only happen if the current lifetime utility of the worker is
lower than the maximum utility she could get from the poaching firm, i.e. V (w, x, y) <
V (f (x, y 00 ), x, y 00 ). In this situation, there is room for a firm y 00 to make an offer.
In the third case, the poaching firm’s productivity is so low that it cannot
make any offer that triggers Bertrand competition. In this case, there is no change
in the worker’s wage and lifetime utility.
Let ỹ(w, x, y) be the minimum productivity level that a firm can trigger a bargaining. The following table summarizes the bargaining outcome between incumbent
firm with productivity y and poaching firm with productivity y 0 :
• y 0 > y: Poaching firm offers φ(x, y, y 0 ), worker moves to firm y 0 and her lifetime
utility becomes V (f (x, y), x, y). See Figure 3.7.
• ỹ(w, x, y) ≤ y 0 ≤ y: Incumbent firm offers π(x, y 0 , y), worker stays with the
incumbent firm and her lifetime utility becomes V (f (x, y 0 ), x, y 0 ). See Figure
3.8.
• y 0 < ỹ(w, x, y): The worker ignores the poaching firm, stays with the incumbent
firm and her lifetime utility remains V (w, x, y). See Figure 3.9.
Now consider an unemployed worker. If she meets a vacancy, the firm has all
the bargaining power, since there is no other firm to make a counteroffer. Hence,
the firm offers the wage rate that makes the unemployed worker indifferent. Let
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Figure 3.7: Worker x in Firm y Matches with Firm y 0 > y.
V (f (x, y 0 ), x, y 0 )

V (f (x, y 0 ), x, y 0 )

V (f (x, y), x, y)

V (f (x, y), x, y)

Firm y 0

Firm y

V (φ(x, y, y 0 ), x, y 0 )

V (w, x, y)

worker moves
to y 0

Firm y 0

Firm y

Figure 3.8: Worker x in Firm y Matches with Firm y 0 ∈ [ỹ, y].
V (f (x, y), x, y)

V (f (x, y), x, y)
V (f (x, y 0 ), x, y 0 )

Firm y 0

Firm y

V (φ(x, y 0 , y), x, y)

worker stays
at y

V (w, x, y)
Firm y

V (f (x, y 0 ), x, y 0 )

Firm y 0

φt (x, 0, y 0 ) be the wage rate that firm y 0 offers to an unemployed worker. φt (x, 0, y 0 )
solves Vt (φt (x, 0, y 0 ), x, y 0 ) = Ut (x).

3.E.5. Market Tightness
Let h(w, x, y) be the measure of workers with skill x employed at firm y earning
wage w and let e? (w, x, y) be the optimal search effort. Let u(x) be the measure of
unemployed workers with skill x. Lastly, let v(y) be the measure of vacancies posted
by firms of type y.
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Figure 3.9: Worker x in Firm y Matches with Firm y 0 < ỹ.
V (f (x, y), x, y)

V (f (x, y), x, y)

nothing
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V (w, x, y)

V (w, x, y)
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Firm y 0

Total search effort in the economy is given by
Z
Et =

Z Z Z

e?t (w, x, y)ht (w, x, y)dwdydx.

ut (x)dx +

Total measure of vacancies in the economy is given by
Z
Vt =

vt? (y)dG(y).

Then, market tightness is given by

θt = Vt /Et .

We define the distribution of vacancies as Γ:
Z
Γt (y) ≡

y

vt (y 0 ) 0
dy .
Vt

with γt (y) is the associated density function.
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(3.11)

3.E.6. Problem of Firm
The present value of a filled vacancy by a firm of productivity y that employs worker
with skill x at wage w is
Jt (w, x, y) = f (x, y) − w
"
+ β (1 − δ)(1 − e?t+1 (w, x, y)λ(θt+1 )Jt+1 (w, x, y)
+ (1 −

δ)e?t+1 (w, x, y)λ(θt+1 )

Zy
+


Γt+1 (ỹt+1 (w, x, y))Jt+1 (w, x, y)

0

0

Jt+1 (φt+1 (x, y , y), x, y)γt+1 (y )dy

0

#
.

ỹt+1

Using integration by parts we get
"
Jt (w, x, y) = f (x, y) − w + β(1 − δ) Jt+1 (w, x, y)
#

(3.12)

0
+ e?t+1 (w, x, y)λ(θt+1 )Jt+1
(φt+1 (x, y 0 , y), x, y)γ(y 0 )dy 0 ,

0
where Jt+1
is the derivative of Jt+1 (φt+1 (x, y 0 , y), x, y) with respect to y 0 .

The main decision the firm gives is how many vacancies to post each period:
"Z

f

max vλ (θt )
v

Z
+

y

ut (x)Jt (φt (x, 0, y), x, y)dx
Z Z

#
Jt (φt (x, y 0 , y), x, y)ht (w, x, y 0 )dwdxdy 0 − κ(v)

A vacancy can be filled by an unemployed worker or an employed worker. The
first term inside the bracket is the expected return to a vacancy that is filled by an
unemployed worker while the second term is the expected return to vacancy filled by
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an employed worker. A firm with productivity y can hire any worker employed at a
firm with lower productivity y 0 < y and pays the worker φt (x, y 0 , y).
First order condition with respect to v is
"Z

λf (θt )

ut (x)Jt (φt (x, 0, y), x, y)dx
Z
+

y

(3.13)

#

Z Z

0

0

Jt (φt (x, y , y), x, y)ht (w, x, y )dwdxdy

0

0

= κ (v).

At an interior optimum, the firm equates the marginal cost of opening an extra
vacancy to return to vacancy.

3.E.7. Problem of the Worker
Now, we are in a position to define the value function for a worker.
First consider a worker with skill level x employed at firm y and earning w.
Suppose she searches for a job with effort level e. The worker gets flow utility of
w − c(e) this period. Next period, with probability δ she becomes unemployed and
earns lifetime utility of an unemployed worker, Ut+1 (x). With probability (1 − δ)
she remains employed and searches for a job. For a given effort level e, she does
not meet with a firm with probability 1 − λ(θt+1 )e and her lifetime utility becomes
Wt+1 (w, x, y). With probability λ(θt+1 )e she meets with a firm. With probability
1 − Γt+1 (y) the poaching firm has productivity y 0 > y. In this case the lifetime utility
of the worker becomes Wt+1 (f (x, y), x, y). With probability Γ(ỹt+1 ), the poaching
firm has productivity y 0 < ỹ. In this case, the lifetime utility of the worker remains
as Wt+1 (w, x, y). If the poaching firm has productivity y 0 ∈ [ỹt+1 , y], then his lifetime
utility becomes Wt+1 (f (x, y 0 ), x, y 0 ).
Hence, the lifetime utility of a worker with skill level x employed at firm y at
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wage w is
"
Wt (w, x, y) = max w − c(e) + β δUt+1 (x)
e

+ (1 − δ)[1 − λ(θt+1 )e]Wt+1 (w, x, y)
h
+ (1 − δ)λ(θt+1 )e (1 − Γt+1 (y))Wt+1 (f (x, y), x, y)
Zy
+

Wt+1 (f (x, y 0 ), x, y 0 )dΓt+1 (y 0 ) + Γt+1 (ỹt+1 )Wt+1 (w, x, y)

(3.14)
#
i

ỹt+1

Consider a worker employed at a firm y with wage rate f (x, y). Clearly,
she has no gain from matching an outside firm, since no firm offers more than
Wt+1 (f (x, y), x, y). In other words, the optimal search effort for such a worker is
0. This implies that the lifetime utility for her is

Wt (f (x, y), x, y) = f (x, y) + βδUt+1 (x) + β(1 − δ)Wt+1 (f (x, y), x, y)

(3.15)

Observe that state variables affect it through the value of unemployment.
Since she does not search on the job, market tightness is irrelevant for on-the-job
value. This implies that y only effects it through the production function. Hence, the
derivative of Wt (f (x, y), x, y) with respect to y is fy (x, y)/[1 − β(1 − δ)].
Using integration by part and derivative of Wt+1 (f (x, y), x, y), the lifetime
utility of an employed worker becomes
"

h
Wt (w, x, y) = maxw − c(e) + β δUt+1 (x) + (1 − δ) Wt+1 (w, x, y)
e

Zy
+ λ(θt+1 )e

#
i
fy (x, y)
[1 − Γt+1 (y 0 )]dy 0
1 − β(1 − δ)

ỹt+1
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(3.16)

Taking derivative with respect to e gives us

c0 (e) = β(1 − δ)λ(θt+1 )

Zy

fy (x, y)
[1 − Γt+1 (y 0 )]dy 0 .
1 − β(1 − δ)

(3.17)

ỹt+1

where the left-hand side is the marginal cost of effort. The right-hand side is
the marginal return to the search effort. (1 − δ)λ(θ) is the increase in the probability
of meeting with a firm. The integral is the return to finding a match. β is the discount
factor. At the optimal solution, the cost of increasing the search effort should be equal
to benefit of increasing the search effort.
Now consider unemployed worker. Unemployed worker has no choice, she
searches for a job with effort level 1. In the current period she gets flow utility of
unemployment b(x). In the next period, with probability λ(θ) she finds a job. Given
the assumption that firms can make take-it-or-leave-it offers to unemployed, finding
a job does not increase lifetime utility. Hence, the lifetime utility of an unemployed
worker with skill x can be written as:

Ut (x) = b(x) + βUt+1 (x).

(3.18)

3.E.8. Distribution Accounting
In this section, we derive how the distribution of workers over employment status
changes over time.
First, consider distribution of unemployed: ut (x). λ(θt ) fraction find a job
and leave unemployment. δ fraction of employed workers with skill level x separate
from their job and become unemployed. Hence, unemployment distribution evolves
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according to
Z Z
ut+1 (x) = ut (x) − λ(θt )ut (x) + δ

h(w, x, y)dwdy.

(3.19)

Similarly, employed distribution evolves according to

ht+1 (w, x, y) =ht (w, x, y) − δht (w, x, y)λ(θt )[1 − Γt (ỹ)]
Z
+ et (w0 , x, ŷ(x, w))λ(θt )γt (y)ht (w0 , x, ŷt (x, w))dw0
Z w
et (w0 , x, y)λ(θt )γt (ŷt (x, w))ht (w0 , x, y)dw0
+

(3.20)

+ 1{w = φt (x, 0, y)}ut (x)γt (y),
where ŷt (x, w) satisfies φt (x, ŷt (x, w), y) = w.

3.E.9. Equilibrium
Definition 4. For given initial distributions u0 (x) and h0 (w, x, y), a competitive
equilibrium is a set of value functions {Ut (x), Wt (w, x, y), Jt (w, x, y)}t , policy functions {e?t (w, x, y), vt? (y)}t prices {φ(x, y, y 0 )t }, market tightness {θt }t and distributions
{ut (x), ht (w, x, y)}t such that
• Value functions solve (3.18), (3.16), (3.12),
• policy functions solve (3.13), (3.17),
• φ(x, y, y 0 ) is the wage rate that solves W (f (x, y), x, y) = W (w, x, y 0 ), and
φ(x, 0, y) is the wage rate that solves U (x) = W (w, x, y),
• market tightness is given by (3.11),
• distributions evolve according to (3.19) and (3.20).
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Figure 3.10: The Discrepancy Between the MCS Forecast and Realized Inflation

Michigan Consumer Survey vs Realized Inflation
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Note: The x-axis refers to the calendar year. The black line represents the difference between the
1-year ahead MCS forecast and the realized inflation. The values above 1 indicate inflation exceeded
forecasts. The red line represents the cumulative real wage loss for a worker who signed his contract
two years ago, based on MCS forecasts. The green line represents the cumulative real wage loss for
a worker who signed his contract five years ago, based on MCS forecasts.

3.F. Additional Analysis
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Figure 3.11: Predictive regressions for inflation mistake and acceptance rate
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Note: The left panel presents the coefficient estimates and the associated 95% CI for β where
‘inflation mistake’ is regressed on the ‘acceptance rate’ with the specification in Equation 3.1. Each
point and the bar correspond to an estimate where the regressors are with the associated lag in
the x-axis. The right panel provides the same plot where the ‘acceptance rate’ is regressed on the
‘inflation mistake’. See Appendix 3.A for details of the data sources.
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